

HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY FROM THE COLD WAR INTO THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: AN ANALYSIS OF DETERRENCE,
FORWARD PRESENCE, AND HOMELAND DEFENSE

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STEPHEN VROOMAN, MAJ, USAR
B.A., Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 1994

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Stephen Vrooman

Thesis Title: Homeland Security Strategy from the Cold War into the Global War on Terrorism: An Analysis of Deterrence, Forward Presence, and Homeland Defense

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Colonel Lawyn C. Edwards, M.M.A.S.

_____, Member
Mr. Robert D. Walz, M.A.

_____, Member
Colonel Jerry D. Jorgensen, Ph.D.

Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGY FROM THE COLD WAR INTO THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: AN ANALYSIS OF DETERRENCE, FORWARD PRESENCE, AND HOMELAND DEFENSE, by MAJ Stephen Vrooman, 110 pages.

Homeland security was restored as America's number one goal of national security strategy following 9/11. The evolution of American national security strategy, from the Cold War years into the post-9/11 years, demonstrated a historical reliance on three key elements: deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses. Each of these three elements is reviewed to identify external threats to the homeland. The problem is that the threat environment changed and the United States strategy did not change. Thus, the central research question is: What are the inherent strategic weaknesses in homeland security strategy and what are the implications for the future? A narrative review of each presidential administration from the Cold War to the 21st Century emphasizes implications on national defense policy and military posture. The research demonstrated America's enduring vulnerabilities include: being slow to act internationally, over-extending its military forces, perpetuating a false sense of security, and a propensity to rely on deterrence too heavily.

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ACRONYMS

ABM	Antiballistic Missile
DoD	Department of Defense
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRC	Major Regional Conflict
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORTHCOM	United States Army Northern Command
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
NSHS	National Strategy for Homeland Strategy
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SCC	Small-Scale Contingency
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
START	Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Opening

The United States is no longer impervious to aggression on its own shore. America's inability to rapidly respond to the regime responsible for the aerial attacks on the Pentagon and Twin Towers in September 2001 stimulated a call to arms. There was an immediate reconciliation of adversary capabilities and national security strategy. Specifically, the defense of the homeland and its security received unprecedented backing, both verbal and financial, as the foremost goal of national security. Homeland security was forced to the forefront of American policymaking out of necessity.

The president of the United States and the US Congress responded to the attacks on military and financial institutions with immediate approval of funding to narrow the gap between adversary capabilities and homeland security capabilities. The financial support was budgeted at \$68.7 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2003 alone.¹

President George W. Bush also proposed and Congress accepted "the most extensive reorganization of the federal government in the past fifty years"² with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security would provide greater unity of purpose for the United States' overlapping federal, state, and local jurisdictions comprised of more than 87,000 different jurisdictions.³ The department would also ensure greater accountability across 22 entities with critical homeland security missions including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Coast Guard.⁴

With so many overwhelming changes and the magnitude of allocated funding, homeland security's renewal had the trappings of a new buzzword, fad, or a revolution. However, reality is quite the contrary. Security of the homeland has always been a tenant of national strategy. Since the American Revolution, the United States has used its geographical location on the globe to strategic advantage. Distanced from the other six continents of the world by oceans on its east and west and bordered on the north and south by two nonthreatening neighbors, the United States grew from a relatively peaceful and privileged infancy. It emerged from its isolationism during World War I, found equal footing throughout World War II, and sparred with fellow superpower Russia before leading the world into the twenty-first century with unparalleled military combat power and great economic and political influence.

As the United States grew in influence and affluence, technology outpaced all other forms of human progress. The task of defending the United States changed dramatically. Adversaries "in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank."⁵ Geographical location of the United States is still a distinct advantage but the technological advancement of weapons and individual capability to travel worldwide in open societies broaden homeland vulnerability.

The United States invests a tremendous amount of research in methods of warfare, but the emphasis has been on tactics and the execution of nuclear, conventional, and low-intensity conflict warfare. Since the major terrorist attacks in 2001, there has been an explosion of terrorism research in the form of war gaming, conspiracy theorizing,

and drawing conclusions from hindsight. Although the United States has been under international terrorist attack for over forty years, relatively little insight exists in effectively confronting terrorism, politically or militarily. Clausewitz would argue the need to “define the kind of war on which the nation is embarking” in order to determine the most appropriate tactics and strategy.⁶ Understanding how America defines and approaches war in the contemporary environment provides insight into mitigating terrorism as the nature of future warfare.

Purpose

This thesis examines how the United States’ approach to war shifted emphasis from protecting the homeland with passive defensive measures in the twentieth century to both reactive and proactive action against the wide array of asymmetric threats posed today by international terrorism. More specifically, this thesis investigates the influence of American national strategy as it related to defending the North American continent during the period from the Cold War through post-11 September.

The US national defense policy and military posture are evaluated against the strategic aims of deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses. In this thesis, deterrence is considered a passive form of prevention as it primarily perpetuates a threat rather than reduces one. Forward presence, typically measured in troop commitment, is an active form of prevention, as well as a response to failed deterrence. And homeland defenses are the measures the nation takes in response to an attack; primarily reactive in terms of establishing a perimeter defense and consequence management, but also inclusive of counterattacking.

National Defense Policy

National defense policy evolved from international isolationism to a Western hemispheric defense in World War II in order to meet adversaries on the sea or on their own soil. Merely staying at home and relying on coastal defenses was unacceptable anymore, and the national will called for American action. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor triggered a call to arms fueled by the moral high ground of protecting freedom and resourced with the entire American economy and industrial capacity. National policy changed not only to protect the American population, but also to actively preserve the founding principles of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” from international aggression.

Following World War II, national policy expanded beyond just concern for the western half of the globe to address the threat of Soviet Communism spreading globally during the Cold War. Most nation-states quickly aligned with the communists or the democracies, and clear lines of demarcation were evident to the degree of building walls to divide Germany and Korea, not just ideologically but physically. Instead of splitting the world in half geographically, the focus was on uniting the hearts and minds behind either of the bipolar influences.

In contrast, the Global War on Terrorism is not restricted to a threat from one or two adversaries, but instead from a proliferation of adversaries with asymmetric capabilities. When President Bush called for a unification of countries by proclaiming, “Either you’re for us or you’re against us,” the world did not agree to such a clear distinction. Just as asymmetric weapons capabilities provide an advantage over a force with greater strength and more weapons systems, the United Nations political umbrella

enables individual nation-states to hold asymmetric influence in uniting the world against international terrorism. Security for the United States and for the world has become one and the same: leading away from the Cold War nuclear threat of mutually assured destruction into a global unity based on mutually assured dependence.

The threat has become any regime “dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the times that bind countries together.”⁷ Thomas Barnett, of the United States Naval College, goes on to detail a map of the world based on identifying countries according to how they aspire to the rule sets of the world or what he labels globalization. Paula J. Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, said globalization has “resulted in a much more inter-connected world with unprecedented freedom of movement.”⁸ Nearly any nation or moderately financed individual can achieve global reach. It is the combination of freedom of movement and disengagement from the world norms that yield a “world increasingly populated by Super-Empowered individuals.”⁹

These super-empowered individuals, when choosing to be terrorist actors, “have no single center of gravity whose destruction would entail the defeat of the entire organization.”¹⁰ As such, terrorists have certain tactical advantages over adversaries of yesteryear and, more importantly, advantages over the United States. They have the principles of initiative and surprise as well as the ability to choose the time, place, and manner of attack. The worlds’ security remains enduringly vulnerable, as long as the locus of control or a single center of gravity that will cause the terrorists to capitulate is unknown.

Military Posture

In contemporary history, the size of a nation's armed forces decreases significantly after any major conflict. This decrease is partially a result of the wartime buildup, but it is primarily in order to refocus on the domestic concerns of the nation. The United States has been no exception in this regard with military drawdowns after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict, and the Gulf War (see figure 1).




Figure 1. DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels, FYs 1950-2002

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [article on-line]; available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/ms8.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 7 February 2004.

Likewise, priority for national spending typically decreases following conflict. Sizing the military forces according to the budget instead of the actual threat environment is a primary danger of national security.

In contrast to the decrease in the armed forces strength and declining budget outlays is the increase in operation tempo. Each successive era reviewed in this research has shown a dramatic rise in the number and nature of operations in which the military are engaged. Although the number of deployed soldiers has grown dramatically in recent years, the number of permanently stationed soldiers overseas has gradually declined. An increase in workload despite a decrease in manpower and funding is a matter of grave concern for an institution responsible not for the bottom-line dollar but the freedom of a nation.

Limits and Delimitations

There are several limitations to this study. First, this study addressed deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses as of national security strategy at the strategic level only. Second, the amount of time available to conduct the research will be limited. Given a small window of time to compile and analyze research, the conclusions may be subject to unintentional personal bias or errors of omission. Third, the literature review will be limited to what can be obtained locally (Kansas and Missouri), through intralibrary loan or on the Internet. The most notable omission will be most of the classified presidential documents of the forty-second and forty-third presidents, Mr. W. J. Clinton and Mr. G. W. Bush. Fourth, the scope of this study will only address resources and events prior to 1 October 2003. Homeland security continues to evolve at a rapid pace; the most recent of which is the cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security

becoming operational on 11 September 2003. The methods, resources, and objectives of homeland security will continue to evolve and the conclusion or recommendation of this study may be contradicted.

This research delimits the measures the United States takes to identify and combat internal threats to homeland security. National security policy will continue to support defending the homeland by preemptive action from forward presence overseas instead of waiting for the fight to reach the North American continent. As such, the preponderance of national security strategy is directed toward external threats to homeland security. This is not to imply that there are no internal threats. Quite the contrary, the internal threat, domestic terrorism, is one of the primary enduring vulnerabilities America must address. But the internal threat is delimited in this thesis to focus the scope of this research.

Methodology

This thesis provides a brief historical perspective of homeland security from the Cold War to post-11 September through the examination of historical and contemporary sources. Sources include a multitude of American national strategy documents and presidential directives, historical primary and secondary accounts of continental defense activities, and a review of current doctrine and congressional testimony. Historical summaries of international terrorism as they apply to the United States were also reviewed, as well as several contemporary analyses of international actors.

Deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses are analyzed with several themes prevalent from the Cold War into the Global War on Terrorism (see table 1).

Table 1. Themes of Homeland Security Strategy

Strategy	Themes
Deterrence	Uncertainty
	False reliance on deterrence
	Narrow strategic focus
	Balance of power emphasizes unilateral action over collective security
Forward Presence	Deployed to shape the environment in U.S. model
	Increased commitment of troops
Homeland Defenses	False sense of security
Military Posture	Decrease in manning
	Decrease in funding
	Increase in OPTEMPO

Relevance

The value of this research lies in its relevance to the enduring vulnerability of the United States to an external threat; more specifically, the susceptibility to the threat imposed by globalization. As an open society, the United States continues to extend the Statue of Liberty's invitation, "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, the wretched refuse of your teeming shore." This same openness increases opportunities for attack and subsequently increases challenges to balancing the rights of the individual citizens with the rights of society.

The relevance of this research is based on several valid assumptions about the enduring external threat environment. The first assumption is that a credible threat to the

homeland still exists from air, sea, space, and land. Susceptibility includes but is not limited to cyberattack on air control, financial or other nationwide systems, weapons of mass destruction, small amounts of sarin gas, anthrax germs, or biological attacks; any of which could bring America to its knees. A second assumption is that globalization enables international actors to attack without warning and without accountability. The proliferation of intelligence gathering capability in the information age adds confusion and clutter to the information refinement process. And without an identifiable actor, there is little recourse for a strategy based on deterrence.

Active preventions, in the form of economic embargo, diplomatic shunning, or troop commitment, are the strongest applications of instruments of national power. Ultimately, the homeland remains at risk and its defense comes at a financial burden to economic prosperity.

This research is significant in that it provides a starting point for analyzing the current and future threat to homeland security. This research will show how the means, ways, and ends of homeland security strategy have changed from the Cold War to post-11 September. This research will also provide lessons learned and a theoretical base for future homeland security strategy. The aim is to answer the most obvious question, What are the relevant future implications discernable from history?

Closing

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the boundaries of the homeland security mission by examining the external threat including the environment and the primary actors, the posture of the United States military, and the national defense policy.

¹*Report to Congressional Committees*, “Fiscal Year 2003 Obligations are Substantial, but May Result in Less Obligations Than Expected,” Military Operations. United States General Accounting Office. September 2003.

²*National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, 2002), vii.

³*Ibid.*, 11.

⁴*Ibid.*, 13.

⁵George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), Introduction.

⁶Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88.

⁷Thomas P. M. Barnett. “The Pentagon’s New Map: It Explains Why We’re Going to War, and Why We’ll Keep Going to War,” *Esquire*, March 2003.

⁸Paula Dobriansky, “Threats to Security in the Western Hemisphere,” Remarks at the Inter-American Defense College (Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2003).

⁹Barnett.

¹⁰*National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 10.

CHAPTER 2

THE COLD WAR YEARS (1945-1991)

We are participants whether we would or not, in the life of the world. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably, our affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and Asia.¹

President Woodrow Wilson

Though this chapter is not directly related to homeland defense, it will set the national defense policy context of each segment of the era. Homeland defense is the subject of national defense policy and can only be clearly appreciated through the lens of the wider policy.

World War I drew the United States from its isolationism into the global picture, and it developed a national security concept of continental defense. The quotation of President Wilson above foreshadows the international obligations of a global community. After World War I, America was still reluctant to actualize President Wilson's insight. Gradually, the United States broadened its security strategy scope to encompass the entire western hemisphere before declaring war and actively joining World War II. Subsequently, following World War II, the national defense policy moved beyond securing the territory, population, and government of the homeland to protecting the economy and national interests abroad to include overseas natural resources, global lines of communication, and containment of communism.

Strategy to secure the homeland during the Cold War focused primarily on the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. "The most important strategic fact of life for each other was the existence and power of the other." ² The

United States' diplomatic influence, the strength and capability of its military forces, and its economic power relative to the Soviet Union's determined the strategy the United States pursued in defending not only its homeland but also its national interests worldwide.

The Oval Office saw nine different American presidents in the Cold War years from 1945 to 1991. Two stepped up from the vice-presidency after the death of the commander in chief, five served consecutive terms, and one resigned during these forty-seven years.

The changes in national security strategy and homeland defense of each presidency are reviewed chronologically in the following pages according to national defense policy and military posture. The chapter concludes with a qualitative analysis of defense policy and quantitative analysis of military posture to summarize the national security strategy for the Cold War years.

National Defense Policy

The Truman Years (1945-1953)

The United States and the Soviet Union emerged victorious from World War II as the most dominant nation-states on the globe and quickly sought to divide the world ideologically. Whether the Soviets were pursuing national security or promoting communist world revolution in accordance with Marxist doctrine, the strategy was one of expansion.³ The strategy for communist expansion centered on exploiting peoples' grievances against their governments and creating national instability. Disenfranchised people--as a result of poverty, government brutality, denial of basic human rights, or a lack of essential services throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin America--were prime targets

in which to promote communist revolution. Hence, the containment of Soviet expansionism became the primary objective of United States security policy.⁴

President Harry S. Truman entered the presidency, as a result of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's death in office, on the "inauguration of the Nuclear Age."⁵ Momentary nuclear superiority and increasing responsibility as a result of globalization influenced the Truman administration's security strategy militarily, economically, and diplomatically.

Military strategy centered on America's monopoly of nuclear weapons as a distinct asymmetric advantage. But atomic bombs and nuclear weapons were strategic level weapons. They did not adequately address the operational and tactical concerns of communist expansion. The strategy did not address maintaining or deploying conventional forces to defeat guerrilla movements or smaller conflicts. Instead of maintaining a large standing force, Truman favored mobilization of reserve forces in the traditional American fashion of "declare and then prepare" for war. Despite claiming a global role for America, the national security strategy exploited only one aspect of the military as a national instrument of power, one the US ended up not being able to use.

American isolationism ended not so much as a result of the scope of countries involved in World War II, but because "airpower and atomic weapons negated the former protection the oceans provided."⁶ Subsequently, America would have to move away from a "declare and then prepare" mentality when faced with a powerful aggressor because it no longer would have the luxury of months to mobilize its forces.⁷

Congress passed domestic legislation in the *National Security Act of 1947* in order to improve defense capability. The act provided the framework to unify civilian and

military security policy at the national level. The National Security Council was created and included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the military service secretaries, and other government organization representatives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were required to develop plans for geographically based “unified commands.”

The first Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, negotiated service roles and missions in 1948 despite being empowered only with supervision authority over the services. The Army had a threefold mission of conducting land operations, providing antiaircraft units to defend the homeland, and manning occupation and security garrisons overseas. The Navy’s mission included all maritime surface and submarine operations to include its own sea-based aviation and that of the Marine Corps. The new Air Force presided over strategic air warfare, air transport, and combat air support for the Army. In 1949, an amendment to the *National Security Act of 1947* strengthened the position of Secretary of Defense, making it the authority figure for central coordination of the three services’ planning and policy.⁸

The continual refinement of civilian control over the US Armed Forces was an indication of a growing nation. Truman’s commitment to international economic assistance, through programs such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, was an indication of America’s growing influence internationally.

The Truman Doctrine targeted the Soviets recruiting center of gravity, the exploitation of internal grievances, by providing economic aid to alleviate conditions in overseas countries that the Soviets targeted.⁹ The Truman Doctrine set the precedent, good or bad, that the United States would intervene in foreign countries to protect United States interests. It also demonstrated the measures the US would take and its resolve to

contain communism and promote democracy worldwide. Early assistance to Turkey and Greece prevented a communist takeover of the Greek government and allowed Turkey to maintain territorial integrity against Soviet Georgia and control of the Dardanelles Straits.¹⁰

The Marshall Plan also helped contain the spread of communism in war-ravaged Europe by reconstructing most of Europe economically and industrially. Truman's Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, developed a plan providing short-term economic aid while the European nations structured their own recovery program. Objectives of the Marshall Plan included reconstruction of industrial and transportation infrastructure, national budgets with strong currencies, international trade, and full employment. The ties the United States established after World War II in Europe set the conditions for diplomatic, military, and economic cooperation. The Soviet Union was not able to exploit Western Europe's weakness in the aftermath of World War II as a result of the Marshall Plan's success--by 1950 Europe's industrial production was 15 percent above prewar levels.¹¹

The international economic successes of the Truman administration were facilitated by a concerted effort in the diplomatic arena abroad. With the Soviet Union as the lead for the communist movement, the United States had to champion democracy, not just out of self-preservation in order to maintain a secure homeland, but also to stem the spread of communism worldwide. "In the years immediately following World War II, full participation in world events became a governing dynamic of American life."¹² The United States could not do this alone and it entered an era of "permanent international agreements and organizations for collective security."¹³

The United Nations Organization was the first such collective security arrangement the United States entered. Founded in 1945 by the United States and forty-nine other countries, by those countries and for those countries, to create “collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression.”¹⁴

In 1947, the Truman administration coordinated the first regional collective defense treaty among twenty-one republics in the Western Hemisphere, the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) stipulating an attack on one country would be considered an attack on all.

In 1949, the United States entered into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a European collective security arrangement designed to counter the growing Soviet threat in Eastern Europe. Membership in NATO certified United States military commitment and enlarged the policy of containment beyond economic assistance.¹⁵ This treaty organization was America’s first peacetime military alliance with foreign states in which US forces were permanently stationed in foreign countries outside a major theater of war.¹⁶

NATO was an integral piece of American diplomacy and influence through establishment of US bases in member countries. The strength of the NATO alliance became the “prime barrier against communist expansionism in Europe” and the cornerstone for United States homeland security strategy.¹⁷

Internally, Truman attempted to allay the individual civilian’s fears after the Soviet Union successfully exploded an atomic bomb over Siberia in 1949. He responded

by establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration with Congress passing the *Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950* to develop a system of fallout shelters nation-wide.

Additionally, Truman worked to maintain relevancy by ordering the Secretaries of State and Defense to reexamine United States strategy and policy after the Soviets demonstrated atomic capability and China was taken over by communists.¹⁸ The product, *NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, was issued in April 1950. It recommended a rapid buildup “to erode Soviet influence and modify Soviet expansionist behavior.”¹⁹ It specifically recommended an increase in military readiness “as a deterrent to Soviet aggression,” to “encourage nations resisting Soviet political aggression,” and as a “basis of immediate military commitments and rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.”²⁰ The FY 1951 defense budget was limited to \$13 billion, but in a congressional election year, few in Congress were going to vote for a defense increase.²¹ Budget limitations drove the decision-making process instead of threat analysis. However, congressional reluctance was overcome by events on 25 June 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.

The outbreak of the Korean War disproved America’s postwar strategic policy. Nuclear weapons were not a deterrent to aggressor nations that lacked significant industrial and population centers to target. Additionally, the “preoccupations with general rather than limited or local wars” and the emphasis on deterrence over actual engagement fed America’s distaste for war.²² But, the strategic policy based on threatened use of nuclear weapons was only effective if adversaries actually believed they would be used. North Korea called the American bluff. Truman refused to attack Chinese or Soviet land and to use atomic weapons.

The war ended with the United States in a world with greater communist influence; communist China emerged as a powerful nation-state and communist North Korea remained a threat to South Korea.

The Korean War, as does any war or conflict, refocused the president, Congress, and the American public on United States defense policy and homeland security. Improvements in defense included an increase of force size and structure balanced to face the challenges in the air, at sea, and on land, as well as greater mobilization capability.

The Eisenhower Years (1953-1961)

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration primarily based defense strategy on nuclear superiority and wielded it as an effective diplomatic tool.²³ The cost of maintaining a conventional military capability to meet the strategic containment policy and overseas commitments made nuclear deterrence attractive as a defense policy.

A "bigger bang for a buck" approach satisfied the short-term objectives and exploited United States armament superiority. Secretary of State John F. Dulles announced the new defense policy of "massive retaliation" in January 1954 as an evolution of communist containment strategy. The new policy was known as the "New Look," and it changed "the rules of engagement for general war."²⁴ Retaliation would be swift, but in the method and location of United States choosing. It relied on strategic airpower for delivery and emphasized defense of the United States from Soviet air attack. The New Look reduced conventional forces capability dramatically and replaced it with tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The new strategy relied on nuclear weapons as the United States only recourse for military engagement. Two Army Chiefs of Staff, General Matthew Ridgeway and General Maxwell Taylor, urged the president to

maintain a balanced force posture to meet both general and limited war requirements, but were rebuffed.²⁵

This almost singular policy ran the same risk that President Truman had faced: Would the United States use nuclear weapons even for a small conflict? To back down would undermine any attempts to reestablish legitimacy since the end of the Korean War. It was a gamble Eisenhower was willing to take.

Eisenhower's collective security goals included pursuing a policy of alliances to friendly nations that were adjacent to communist nations. The United States already had mutual defense agreements with NATO, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. In 1954, the United States entered into a treaty with Taiwan, as well as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization with Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

Changes at home by the Eisenhower administration included national programs at the Department of Defense (DoD) level, as well as the individual citizen level. Efforts to extend the North American defenses required continued coordination with Canada to complete a perimeter of warning stations across Alaska and northern Canada by 1957.²⁶ The United States also developed intermediate-range (1,500 miles) nuclear missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with a 5,000-mile range.

In October 1957, *Sputnik*, the first man-made satellite, was launched by the Soviet Union and demonstrated that it had rocket thrust that Americans could not match. This defeated the strategy of using nuclear weapons as a deterrent and renewed interest in civil defense, just as it had under Truman's administration. While Truman focused on fallout shelters, Eisenhower aimed his civil defense strategy at mass evacuation from target

cities. The *1956 Interstate Highway Act* facilitated this aim, but it was unrealistic given the limited warning time of a nuclear strike and the resulting traffic gridlock of an exodus.

Noted Cold War-era physicist Herbert York contended that civil defense was propaganda designed to give citizens hope and maintain a sense of control in their lives.²⁷ He relayed conversations he had with then New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who spoke of stiffening the backbone of America by making citizens believe they could survive a nuclear war. Civil defense measures included instruction in schools, underground facilities, and the dispersion of critical new government buildings. But as time went on and the destructive capability became quantifiable, the Eisenhower administration admitted civil defense programs could reduce loss of life only to a small degree.²⁸

Another domestic initiative for the Eisenhower administration focused on increased funding for math, science, and technology education. Less than three months after the launch of *Sputnik*, the United States successfully launched its first space satellite, *Explorer I*. Following about six months later in July 1958 the National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA) was established.

On the international scene the Eisenhower administration broadened the Truman administration's scope of foreign economic aid to include nonaligned nations. Latin America reforms were funded primarily out of the belief "that the region's economic problems could lead to Communist takeover."²⁹ The Middle East was another key recipient of policy change because of its oil resources and its sea lines of communication where Soviet Union influence was denied. The Eisenhower Doctrine, an expansion of the

Truman Doctrine, included economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries that were threatened by direct or indirect communist aggression.³⁰

In 1958, Eisenhower sent Marines to Beirut at the request of Lebanese President Shamun to reassure allies in the region that the United States would act on its policy. A civil war followed, but the United States did not participate. The use of military forces as a show of force failed in Beirut in 1958. It demonstrated the need for a clear security policy and the lack of appreciation for how the military could be used effectively as a diplomatic tool.

Simultaneously, military reductions continued just as they had under Truman's administration, shaping the force to meet budget constraints, instead of national security commitments. By 1958, the Army had shrunk from its 1953 level of 20 combat divisions and 1,500,000 men to 15 divisions and less than 900,000 men to cover worldwide security commitments.³¹

Unexpectedly, the Soviets quickly achieved parity with the United States atomic and nuclear arsenals and undermined the New Look policy. Eisenhower, facing domestic recession and inflation, was constrained to a zero-sum game in defense spending. The "New New Look" attempted to create the right balance of forces in the military without increasing the defense budget. Eisenhower's revised strategy weakly recognized that conventional forces would have the prominent role for action in any limited war.³² Despite this knowledge, his strategy continued to rely on tactical nuclear weapons to deter or wage small wars. This part of the new policy was fundamentally flawed. Use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield would most certainly escalate any limited conflict to a general nuclear war.³³ And almost everyone knew it!

The Kennedy Years (1961-1963)

President John F. Kennedy recognized the need for a more balanced force structure and that neither massive retaliation nor tactical nuclear weapons would stop insurgencies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.³⁴ The Kennedy administration officially shifted from nuclear to conventional forces with a more flexible response as the primary means of deterrence and abandoned budget restraints as a basis for force sizing.³⁵ Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara centralized planning and programming of United States military force structure and increased combat strength immediately. Although America's nuclear force buildup could not be matched by the Soviets until the end of the 1960s, the "flexible response" strategy was developed to deploy a force structure to meet any threat, conventional or nuclear.³⁶

Kennedy's nuclear policy departed from previous administrations by relying on a nuclear inventory large enough to deter any attack instead of "first strike" as United States nuclear policy. McNamara introduced and later refined second-strike capability called "assured destruction" of a first-strike aggressor.³⁷ Kennedy and McNamara also shifted to the "no cities" targeting policy declaring that the United States would only target enemy military forces and not civilian populations. Policy had some room for interdiction including the entire concept of an effective counterforce capability and withstanding the first strike to retaliate.³⁸

Kennedy pushed for civil defense in 1961, but after his assassination in 1963, McNamara stated, "Defense of our cities against a Soviet attack would be a futile waste of our resources."³⁹ Protection of the American populace on its own soil was not a key stipulation in defense policy after the Kennedy era again until after 2001.

Conventional forces were increased to respond to the more likely challenges short of nuclear engagement. The conventional capabilities were enlarged to counter low-intensity conflicts. The force size was the basis for asserting that the United States could synchronize a “two-and-a-half” war posture. Proven inaccurate with the conflict in Vietnam, the stated assertion was that the United States could fight a large-scale war in Europe simultaneously with another large-scale war elsewhere in the world, and a small-scale threat.⁴⁰

Although the Kennedy administration was the first to increase the Armed Forces strength in a non-war situation he did not develop a policy to use them. His inaugural address challenged the world: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”⁴¹ But Kennedy’s action never matched his rhetoric. He never established a threshold for commitment of troops and Flexible Response lacked comprehension of the long term, unintended consequences.

Flexible Response led to escalation of US economic and military support for President Diem’s corrupt and brutal South Vietnamese government fighting against a communist insurgency. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge advised Kennedy that the war could not be won with Diem in power and the United States took no action to prevent a coup and the assassination of Diem. The result was a succession of regimes completely dependent on the United States.

By sending troops into Vietnam, Kennedy followed Eisenhower's lead in Beirut only a few years earlier. The United States was again involved in a country of secondary importance to its own security interest without clear, achievable objectives.

The 1961 failed Bay of Pigs invasion, an attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro, created doubt about Kennedy's power, and Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin. A second Berlin crisis lasted for a year with refugees pouring out of East Berlin until the communists built a wall to stop the exodus. Khrushchev also sent offensive weapons into Cuba and created the greatest threat to the United States homeland to date in the Cold War.⁴²

The United States had photographic proof of Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, and Kennedy placed nuclear forces on alert. Fighter-interceptor squadrons and missile defense battalions were moved south to improve air defenses, and the Army moved over 30,000 troops south, prepared to invade Cuba. American aircraft and warships quarantined Cuba. The crisis ended when Khrushchev agreed to remove missiles from Cuba and when Kennedy agreed to remove missiles from Turkey, to not invade Cuba, and to lift the quarantine on Cuba.

The Johnson Years (1963-1969)

After the removal of Khrushchev in 1964, the Soviets built a naval fleet intending to compete with the American Navy on almost every ocean in the world by the 1970s.⁴³ Now the Soviet Union had another weapon to add to its arsenal to threaten United States homeland security.

McNamara refined United States nuclear policy in response to obvious weaknesses and illogic in the counterforce strategy. Assured destruction was more clearly

defined to include the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy after the enemy launched a first strike.⁴⁴ Numerically, it meant destroying 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet population and about 50 percent of Soviet industry after the Soviet Union has executed a surprise attack on the United States.⁴⁵ This changed Kennedy's nuclear targeting strategy somewhat--it allowed striking of Soviet cities in a controlled discriminating way, while destroying as many military targets as possible.⁴⁶

"Mutual assured destruction" (MAD) came into use later to describe the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union had the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on each other. But MAD was flawed as a homeland defense strategy as a stand-alone tenant. The presumption was that the cost of nuclear war was so great that no one would initiate a nuclear war. There are multitudes of scenarios that can set a nuclear war in motion, such as misinformation, rogue state control, coup, or terrorism. And as such, there is a possibility almost a likelihood, that deterrence will fail and a genuine defense posture takes that into consideration.

McNamara's policy did not have guidelines or programs developed for the deployment of nuclear forces if deterrence failed. Instead, he allowed the strategic bomber force to decline, cancelled the B-70 intercontinental bomber program, and built up land- and sea-based nuclear strike capability with Minutemen ICBMs and Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). By 1968, the United States strategic missile force consisted of 54 Titan II and 1,000 Minutemen land-based missiles and 656 Polaris SLBMs.⁴⁷

Having ceded the initiative to the Soviets by declaring a "no first strike" policy, the United States could only target cities and industrial areas, because any counterforce

targets would already have been launched in a nuclear exchange. Furthermore, none of the missiles in the inventory could be retargeted after launch.

Solely relying on MAD with no contingency plans, no better alternative, and no flexibility placed the national military strategy in a wait and see posture. In essence, McNamara had now created the antithesis of the flexible response options that he and Kennedy worked to create in 1961.

The damage to US homeland defense was not limited to strategic nuclear offense and defense. After Kennedy's death, Johnson struggled between increasing the number of ground troops in Vietnam and minimizing the burden of the conflict on the domestic economy. In an attempt to retain American credibility, the Johnson administration turned to a policy of gradual escalation. By escalating United States involvement in Vietnam, Johnson and McNamara put United States credibility in question globally. Loss of the war would mean loss of confidence in the United States ability to contain communism and fight insurgencies. It could also embolden enemies to challenge United States influence, diplomatically and militarily. It was believed that Vietnam was the first in a chain of dominoes; if Vietnam fell to communism then the rest of Southeast Asia would soon follow in succession.

But President Johnson did not want to jeopardize funding for his "Great Society" domestic programs. McNamara developed a war strategy to make it appear like the United States was winning the war at a relatively cheap cost with minimal public and congressional scrutiny. He developed a strategy of graduated pressure by a deliberate and controlled escalation of military force strength.⁴⁸ McNamara refused to listen to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerns about continuing to pursue a limited effort. Instead, he

substituted television images and body counts for an actual strategy with clear measures of effectiveness. Ultimately, McNamara resigned in 1967 and Johnson did not seek reelection in 1968 with the war still being fought in the jungles of Vietnam.

The war in Vietnam became a test of US resolve in fighting communism. Johnson did not want to lose American credibility so he committed large-scale ground forces.⁴⁹ Yet, with the loss of over 50,000 United States lives, South Vietnam still became the latest accession to communism.

The Nixon Years (1969-1974)

Faced with an unpopular and expensive war, President Richard Nixon began a policy of Vietnamization through détente; a “structure of peace” which would offer “an honorable way out of Vietnam.”⁵⁰ A gradual pullout of United States troops would force the South Vietnamese to take on the responsibility of winning by themselves.⁵¹

Vietnamization was an outgrowth of Nixon doctrine, a policy requiring nations threatened by insurgencies and local wars to bear responsibility for their own defense while the United States would limit support to material and economic assistance. The Nixon doctrine was a direct result of America’s entanglement in an unpopular war and Nixon was determined to prevent any further such involvements.

Aside from engagement in Vietnam, instability during the early 1970s included economic inflation, an energy crisis accelerated by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and a rise in terrorist activity.⁵²

In early 1973, Henry Kissinger signed a peace accord with the North Vietnamese and the last American combat troops left South Vietnam. The peace agreement allowed over 140,000 North Vietnamese troops to remain in South Vietnam and by April 1975, it

was obvious the North Vietnamese had lied as they captured Saigon. Almost simultaneously Cambodia and Laos fell under Communist control and “the domino theory appeared to become a fact . . . ending the United States long ordeal in Asia in triple disaster.”⁵³

The Vietnam War highlighted the critical importance of a clear national policy and a strategy to execute the policy. In this case, defeat in a country of secondary importance eroded United States credibility as a champion of the containment of communism and directly affected United States defense policy for decades to come.

By 1969, the Soviets had surpassed the United States in the number of land-based ICBMs deployed. The Nixon administration responded by authorizing updated replacement systems in the nuclear missiles to reduce Soviet missile effectiveness. The Soviets were finally ready to talk arms control. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) began in 1969, and a treaty was reached in 1972 that limited the numbers of nuclear offensive systems. Yet, this treaty ended any possibility for the United States to maintain a strategic superiority over the Soviets, with offensive or defensive weapon systems because the Soviets continued to build its nuclear force arsenal during SALT I. They gained a marked advantage in sheer numbers of missile and improved capability, over-matching the United States.

The Ford Years (1974-1977)

President Gerald Ford inherited a nation angry about Vietnam and angry about the Watergate scandal. America’s credibility as a bastion of democracy against communism was suspect. Now United States conventional forces and nuclear strategy were in question.

Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger changed the strategic doctrine to better match the newly increased threat environment. Schlesinger wanted options and flexibility to respond selectively to any attack or to limit further escalation and prevent collateral damage as much as possible. He defined this strategy in the concept of flexible strategic targeting.⁵⁴ Schlesinger lobbied for parity with the “strongest competitor,” which was the Soviet Union for nuclear weapons systems and conventional forces. He argued that by maintaining a weakened capability, the United States and NATO “lowered the threshold for nuclear exchange.”⁵⁵

But Congress would not fund expensive defense programs as threat analysis and needs assessments took a back seat to growing inflation, 20 percent interest rates, a tripled budget deficit, a looming presidential election, and the still fresh memory of Vietnam. Schlesinger was forced to resign as Ford ran for reelection on a balanced budget platform requiring extensive defense cuts.

The Carter Years (1977-1981)

President Jimmy Carter completely reversed the direction of the Nixon Doctrine regarding security assistance. In response to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan Carter warned: “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”⁵⁶ Carter’s 1980 State of the Union address was the first statement by a president of possible use of United States troops to protect vital interests in this case, Persian Gulf resources.

The Russians invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and ended any chance of United States Senate ratification of the SALT II. After a decade of military force reductions and under

funding, it was also doubtful whether the United States military could actually execute the Carter doctrine. The Soviet military was already in Afghanistan so it had proximity to the Middle East. The Soviets could use Afghanistan as a forward staging base for bomber attacks on United States naval forces in the Arabian Sea and as well as extend the range of fighter protection in a potential conflict with the United States.

Other international enemies knew the United States was vulnerable and took advantage of the situation. In November 1979, sixty-six hostages were taken at the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran. The crisis did not end until the day President Reagan was inaugurated, 444 days later. Sandinistas also defeated the American-supported Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979 and sparked fears of another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

Carter established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) for missions in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In an effort to restore United States strategic deterrent capability the RDJTF attempted to rescue American hostages in Iran.⁵⁷ The failure was one of command and control and joint interoperability but the strategic impact demonstrated the loss of American defense capability. The Carter years were a disaster to American defense policy.

The Reagan Years (1981-1989)

President Ronald Reagan completely changed the direction United States defense policy when he initiated the largest peacetime military expansion in United States history. His goal was to offset the strategic and conventional force balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, so the United States could confront the Soviet Union from a position of strength.⁵⁸ Reagan abandoned détente because it failed to enhance United

States security; détente ignored Soviet expansionism and inadequately addressed the Soviet's upper hand in nuclear weapons.⁵⁹

Reagan's 1982 national security strategy went beyond the containment strategy of previous administrations. He targeted the Soviet strategic gains of the last 35 years. The new objective was "to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces."⁶⁰

International terrorism was on the rise and the Reagan administration found itself struggling with this new kind of warfare in addition to the Soviet threat. The dawn of terrorism began with the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and continued through the Reagan administration with the 1981 kidnapping of Brigadier General James Dozier, the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks and US Embassy in Beirut, another bombing of the US Embassy Annex in Beirut in 1984, the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport massacres, the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, and subsequent execution of US Navy diver Robert Stetham, the April 1986 bombing of the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, and the murders of several American military and diplomatic representative throughout the 1980s.⁶¹

In October 1986, Congress approved a new unified command--United States Special Operations Command--to combat this new threat. The executive and legislative branches of the government agreed to fund this new command with an additional \$200 million and a 50 percent increase in manpower from 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers. But Reagan's policy of "swift and effective retribution" proved to be impossible to achieve consistently.⁶²

One constraint to a swift response was timely and actionable intelligence. The demand for human intelligence increased exponentially to combat terrorism, but the intelligence community was operating with an aged capability.⁶³ Another restraint was self-imposed by President Reagan when he ruled out use of force in a public statement during the TWA Flight 847 hostage crisis. Eventually, he even broke his own pledge of “no deals” with the terrorists when Israel resolved the crisis by agreeing to exchange Shiite prisoners for the hostages. In yet another concession to terrorism, Reagan’s negotiation team brokered an arms-for-hostages deal with Iran from 1985 to 1986 to free five Americans in Lebanon.⁶⁴

Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi sponsored the Abu Nidal terrorist group in November 1985 to hijack an Egypt Air Flight as it took off from Athens. Sixty people were killed in the explosion as Egyptian commandos attempted a rescue. The next month Abu Nidal, again supported by Qaddafi, perpetuated massacres at the Rome and Vienna airports. Qaddafi followed these attacks with orders to his Libyan People’s Bureaus to attack United States military installations and to target locations where Americans gathered overseas. Four months later in April 1986, Libyan agents detonated a bomb in Berlin’s La Belle discotheque killing two American soldiers and a Turkish woman.⁶⁵

Reagan responded with a poorly supported conventional F-111 attack aiming to destroy Qaddafi’s ability to support terrorism. Britain was the only European country willing to support the United State’s raid on Libya. The attack occurred but lacked sufficient combat power to destroy Libya’s ability to sponsor terrorist acts. American and British hostages were killed in retaliation and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 is suspected to also have been in retaliation.⁶⁶ Repeated terrorist attacks on America and its

allies were dealt with on a piecemeal fashion and the threat intensified in defiance of conventional force capability.

Reagan's security assistance policy provided mixed results for homeland security. The Reagan Doctrine took the Carter Doctrine one step farther than prevention of Soviet control to reverse Sovietization of countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. He realized that no policy of the last two decades had stopped the expansion of communism so he took a chapter from the Soviet's own book on recruiting strategies. His 1985 State of the Union address was very clear, "Support for freedom fighters is self-defense."⁶⁷ Just as the Soviets had spread communism via insurgent movements of disenfranchised peoples, Reagan sought to erode Soviet influence by supporting anti-communist insurgencies.

He added this technique to his recently expanded conventional and Special Operations Forces arsenals. But it, like the Special Operations Forces application to counter-terrorism, was constrained. Yet, even this time the Reagan administration was restrained by its own disjointed and uncoordinated policy on Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

Reagan also made sweeping changes in arms control with the Soviets. He abandoned SALT, with its emphasis on ceilings on nuclear weapons, in favor of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in 1982. Again, instead of limiting (SALT) Soviet influence Reagan attempted to reduce or reverse it. In March 1983, Reagan changed the deterrence policy by abandoning MAD in favor of a space-based missile defense system—the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This program would enable the United States to destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached American or allied soil. This gave

Reagan options in the event of a nuclear strike, much like Secretary Schlesinger worked for until forced to resign under President Ford.

The Soviets wanted no part of START and claimed SDI violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and was destabilizing. The Soviets began working on a nationwide ABM system of their own based on missile detection and tracking radars.

But SDI was to remain only an initiative as the scientific community and Congress harbored grave doubts about the feasibility and acceptability of the program.⁶⁸ Research continued but with the change in the threat environment, the national security policy was driven by the domestic policy in the 1990s. Economically, the annual federal budget deficit exceeded \$400 billion, the annual trade deficit was \$77 billion and the 1991 cumulative national debt was just under \$4 trillion. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the signing of new arms treaties with Russia, President Clinton would later abandon SDI in 1993. Instead he established the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to research ground-based ABM systems, now more than ten years behind Soviet ground-based development.⁶⁹

The Bush Years (1989-1991)

In 1989, newly elected President George Bush made arms control with the Soviets one of his top priorities. He and Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, built on the START negotiations of the Reagan era. By mid-1991, START I produced a negotiated nuclear arms control treaty reducing both United States and Soviet nuclear warheads to 6000 each.⁷⁰

In September 1991, Bush unilaterally announced the withdrawal of all United States land-based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases and sea-based tactical

nuclear warheads from surface and sub-surface craft, and stood down all strategic bombers from alert status. He also accelerated the scheduled deactivation under START I and immediately stood down all ICBMs and ended the mobile ICBM program. One week later, Russian President Gorbachev responded in a like fashion.

Two months later the Nunn-Lugar Legislation authorized up to \$400 million to help the Soviet Union destroy its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. This was another positive step for arms reduction by providing the Soviet Union incentive to prevent the proliferation of such weapons as they downsized.

One month later, on 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and Boris Yeltsin became the new President of Russia, now called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Yeltsin and Bush improved on the START I agreement and reduced the nuclear warhead count to less than 3,500 each on ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.

Military Posture

This portion of the chapter will focus on the changes in the defense budget and the strength and capabilities of the Armed Forces. As in the first half of the chapter, each presidency during the Cold War will be reviewed chronologically.

The Truman Years (1945-1953)

The American policy of communist containment was a defensive measure, a policy essentially initiated as an economic assistance program. Soviet forces remained over four million strong with viable industrial support. President Truman still needed a strong military force to support him.⁷¹

But public and Congressional pressure, and a determination to balance the national budget, ushered in a quick and poorly planned demobilization. At the end of World War II, the United States Armed Forces had about 12 million people in over 100 combat Army Divisions, 1,200 Navy combatant ships, and over 200 Army Air Corps tactical groups.⁷² In the four months of October 1946 through January 1947, the eight million-man Army decreased more than 45 percent (see figure 2). By the end of June 1946, the Army had dropped to 1.89 million soldiers, a 76 percent decrease in nine months. The downward pace slowed then, descending toward a 1.07 million mark (including a 400,000 member Air Force) by July 1947. The Navy and Marine Corps dropped 34 percent in the same nine-month period to 1.14 million strong.

The dramatic decline in military manpower required a rapid industrial and manpower mobilization capability if atomic weapons failed to deter or decisively defeat the Soviet Army. “In a future world war, the United States would no longer be shielded by powerful allies and would have to participate fully from the outset.”⁷³ The Navy, with its established naval aviation and sea-based capability, played its card as “sea power remained indispensable to the strategic mobility without which the United States could not remain a superpower.”⁷⁴ But the strategic bombers of the newly established Air Force were the natural choice for atomic bombing and stood as the only branch of the Armed Forces with a clear objective in the new national strategy.

In the midst of postwar confusion and focusing of national direction, the Truman administration desired to effect change under a declining DoD budget. The \$14.4 billion budget in 1947 dropped to \$11.7 billion in 1948. The \$11 billion proposed for 1949

allowed for fifty-five Air Force wing groups and one supercarrier for the Navy.⁷⁵ Dollars spoke to the administrations policy priorities.

Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson sought a cheap, economical defense, based mainly on strategic airpower, in order to deliver atomic bombs in the event of a nuclear war. He even cut defense spending below President Truman's recommended lower limit.⁷⁶ The Navy's funding for the "supercarrier" was cancelled and a "revolt of admirals" publicly warned that the nation was being stripped of offensive power.⁷⁷

Any concerns voiced by the military were proven out with the onset of the Korean War as the United States first declared and then prepared for the conflict. In 1950, US forces consisted of ten Army divisions, 671 Navy ships, two Marine divisions, and 48 Air Force wings. The only viable, rapidly deployable forces were the 18 wings of the Strategic Air Corps; the atomic strike force.⁷⁸ But a nuclear response would have been "disproportionate both in morality and in expediency."⁷⁹ Instead, Truman turned to General MacArthur's understrength, undertrained four division army of occupation in Japan because it was closest in proximity. The Navy provided sealift and both Air Force and Naval aviators supported the ground forces ultimately restoring the South Korean border at the 38th parallel after a successful amphibious landing at Inchon by the 1st Marine Division. MacArthur's adherence to the traditional American desire for victory appeared to urge him northward versus settling for peace in a still-divided country. Truman and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to persuade MacArthur that suing for peace in accordance with the United Nations mandate was the most appropriate conclusion to the Korean War. Consequently, MacArthur was relieved

from command on 11 April 1951 and “American strategy continued to rely on air power to turn the balance in favor of the United Nations ground forces.”⁸⁰

With the innovation of nuclear weapons mankind possessed the power of mass self-destruction. Truman was faced militarily with maintaining nuclear armament parity with the Soviet Union as the world’s two opposing superpowers, but he also wrestled with maintaining and improving a relevant conventional force posture. Economically, the Truman administration provided for the recovery of Japan, but also aided Turkey and Greece to limit the influence of communism. Diplomatically, Truman successfully ushered the United States into long lasting international collective security treaties to slow communist expansion.

The Eisenhower Years (1953-1961)

After being conditioned to the military decisiveness of World Wars I and II, Americans found the Korean War stalemate frustrating. Signing of the armistice ceased the killing, but the tension returned with the transition back to cold war. The Korean War demonstrated that the United States would have to rely on its own Armed Forces to stem the flow of communism. The use of military force would become a greater instrument of national power as the likelihood of attaining United States foreign policy objectives through diplomacy alone diminished.⁸¹

The Eisenhower administration reduced the percentage of defense spending in the national budget after the high outlays during the Korean War and relied heavily on strategic air power for national defense. While the defense budget actually increased from \$34 billion in fiscal year 1954 to \$45.7 billion in 1960, its percentage of the national budget dropped 10 percent and the percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP)

dropped from 13.8 to 9.1 percent (see figure 3). The bulk of the money was not spent on manpower, but instead was allocated to countering the Soviet nuclear threat and strengthening American nuclear capabilities and countermeasures.⁸² The subsequent imbalance in force structure detracted from the readiness of all branches in the armed forces to wage a more likely limited, conventional war.⁸³

Armed Forces strength dropped from over 3.6 million active duty members as Eisenhower won the presidential election to 2.5 million eight years later. The Army took a 43 percent cut while the Navy and Air Force reduced 22 percent and 17 percent, respectively (see figure 4).

In 1956 a major tactical reorganization of the US Army created pentomic divisions and missile commands to provide a conventional means of confronting the nuclear threat. Mobile units with tactical nuclear fire support became standardized across the Army and they were designed specifically to be airtransportable. The triangular division was replaced with five self-contained battle groups capable of independent operations. Manpower dropped from 17,000 to 13,500 for each division but firepower was increased with artillery and missiles, both armed with conventional and nuclear warheads. Heavier long-range missiles were found in the missile commands.⁸⁴

Battlefield mobility was paramount and innovations across the services yielded not only a more mobile force but increased individual force capabilities. The M113 armored personnel carriers, amphibious vehicles, transportable bridges, M60 battle tanks, increased use of helicopters, miniaturization in communications and computers and radars all led to a dependence on humans capable of operating these machines. Thus, mobilizing and training civilians for a year or two as in past wars would no longer be

practicable. Retaining more capable men became important with the technological advances during the fifties.⁸⁵

The Kennedy Years (1961-1963)

President Kennedy was determined to provide a more flexible defense posture that would enable the United States to back its diplomacy with appropriate military force. With the perception that the United States and the Soviets had ICBM parity he increased the defense budget enabling the American stockpile to grow more than six-fold in number giving a three-to-one advantage to the United States.⁸⁶

Kennedy also extended America's defense to the entire free world and desired an appropriately targeted response.⁸⁷ Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was tasked to develop the force structure necessary to meet the security threat without regard for a budget ceiling. Yet, once the force structure was developed he was to make that force exist at the lowest possible cost.⁸⁸ Under McNamara's guidance the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System laid out the defense budget according to each armed services functions and requirements.⁸⁹

Primarily, "a wider range of usable military power" meant stronger conventional forces.⁹⁰ The Army increased over 20 percent to bring manning to over one million soldiers in 1962 (see figure 5). The number of combat divisions increased from eleven to sixteen. The Navy's surface fleet was enlarged, and McNamara proposed a 400 percent increase in strategic airlift capability. The counterinsurgency force capability was greatly enhanced with the establishment of the Army Special Forces in an effort to counter communist insurgencies. The importance of reserve unit mobilization and pre-positioned stocks overseas was integral in the strategy of flexible response⁹¹

Defense spending was on a gradual rise during the Kennedy administration yet the percentage of defense spending in the national budget continued its diametrically opposed gradual downward trend. The defense budget grew from \$47.5 billion in 1961 to \$51.1 billion in 1962, and \$52.7 billion in 1963 despite stabilizing at 9 percent of the GDP (see Figure 11).⁹²

The Johnson Years (1963-1969)

President Lyndon Johnson “firmly believed that U.S. military strength would resolve the problem in Vietnam.”⁹³ He clearly did not want to place American boys “nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to do for themselves.”⁹⁴ Yet, the number of active duty members dropped less than 2 percent from 1963-1965.⁹⁵ With economic aid programs proving ineffective in South Vietnam , Johnson decided on a strategic bombing campaign. Ultimately, the decision to place American planes in Vietnam pulled ground forces in also as a means of defending the airbases. Gradual escalation of American presence continued as the United States pursued a policy of Americanizing the war and getting caught in the cyclic argument, “The longer the United States remained in Vietnam, the longer it had to stay.”⁹⁶

The Johnson administration increased military strength over 31 percent to bring the number of active duty personnel over 3,546,000 (see figure 5). 1968 was the highest active duty strength since the Korean War and stills stands as the last time that American active duty forces exceeded the 3.5 million mark.⁹⁷

Despite a growth in manpower the defense budget dropped to less than 50 percent of the national budget; the first time since 1947 (see figure 6). The defense budget had to compete with the “Great Society” initiatives. Funding these initiatives dramatically

increased inflation because Johnson elected to fund them by borrowing money instead of raising taxes.⁹⁸

The Nixon Years (1969-1974)

President Richard Nixon's doctrine of Vietnamization and détente not only encouraged international responsibility by allies but required it as the White House announced the first reduction of United States forces in Vietnam. The manpower drawdown in Vietnam mandated that any nation directly threatened had the onus for its own defense, with its own troops.⁹⁹ Nixon was not leaning toward isolationism as much as he was sharing the burden and responsibilities for restoring regional stability.

The troop drawdown in Vietnam was matched with a force reduction of 35 percent between 1969 and 1973 (see figure 7). Dropping from 3.458 million active duty members in 1969 to 2.252 million in 1973 brought the strength to pre-Korean War manning. The Army took the brunt of the cuts with a 47 percent decrease, an exodus in 1972 exceeding 313,000 soldiers.¹⁰⁰

Defense spending as a percentage of the GDP continued its gradual decline and the percentage of the Federal outlays dropped to its lowest mark in the Cold War to date, 31.2 percent (see figure 6).

The Ford Years (1974-1977)

Lack of congressional and presidential support for defense improvements in the 1970s reduced the strategic and conventional defense capability to what was commonly called the "hollow force" during the Carter years. The United States had no long-range strategic bomber capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses. It had declining sea-based

airpower and Naval strategy that changed to “defensive sea control” instead of forward-based deterrence because of the loss of aircraft carriers.

The defense budget as a percentage of GDP fell from 9.4 percent in 1968 to 5.3 percent in 1976 (see figures 6 and 8).¹⁰¹ Conversely, the Soviets increased defense spending by about 5 percent per year throughout the 1970s. During this decade the Soviets produced “six times as many tanks, twice as many combat aircraft, and three times as many ships, while developing twice as many new strategic systems.”¹⁰²

The overall effect of this defense imbalance was strategically a dereliction of duty. The United States ICBMs were at risk in a first strike, the Navy no longer maintained unchallenged control of the sea, and both the United States and NATO countries were vulnerable to attacks by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.¹⁰³ Additionally, there was a gradual three percent decrease over the Ford presidency in active duty strength, most noticeably in the Air Force that lost 10 percent of its manpower.¹⁰⁴

One positive improvement in homeland defense was the renewal of the North American Air Defense treaty in 1975. The revised treaty gave Canada responsibility for its own air defense for the first time, much like the burden and responsibility sharing of the Nixon Doctrine.¹⁰⁵

The Carter Years (1977-1981)

President Carter canceled production on the B-1 strategic bomber because it was not deemed to be cost-effective. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown thought the cruise missile would be a more effective and cheaper deterrent.¹⁰⁶

Troop strength and defense spending hit plateaus during the Carter administration. Overall active duty strength numbers during the administration dropped gradually until 1980 when they approached the same levels as when Carter entered office (see figure 7). Despite the late increase in force strength defense spending stayed at 5 percent of the GDP and 23 percent of the national budget very consistently during the Carter years (see figure 8).

In response to terrorism and continued instability in the Middle East, Carter called for development of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force that would respond and deploy quickly, with naval and air support, to crisis situations around the world. It was to be a 100,000-man force comprised of Army and Marine Corps units.¹⁰⁷ Continued development and modification of Carter's 1980 request for a rapid deployment joint task force resulted in activation of United States Central Command in 1983 by President Reagan.¹⁰⁸

The United States strategic arsenal consisted of a triad increasingly vulnerable to qualitative improvements in the Soviet ICBM force.¹⁰⁹ The strategic triad consisted of land-based ICBMs, nuclear missile-armed submarines, and long-range strategic bombers.

The Reagan Years (1981-1989)

President Reagan instituted the largest peacetime military expansion in United States history as the defense budget tripled from 1981 to 1984.¹¹⁰ Likewise, the Air Force, Navy, and Marines grew as the total active duty forces increased 4.5 percent from 1981 to 1987.¹¹¹ The Reagan administration increased the Navy's fleet 18 percent (to a total of 567 warships) in 7 years to reclaim maritime superiority.¹¹² In October 1981, President Ronald Reagan announced he was reversing former President Carter's

cancellation of the B-1 bomber. Production of these bombers would replace the aging B-52 force until the “stealth” strategic bomber was operational in the 1990s.¹¹³ The Reagan administration created or reorganized four divisions into “light” divisions, a smaller size with lighter armament. They were highly mobile and required fewer aircraft to deploy than even airborne divisions.¹¹⁴

During the Reagan administration, military doctrine and strategy flourished. The new national security strategy called for a revision of force structure and a new doctrine on how to employ the new force on sea, land, and in the air. Conventional forces doctrine emphasized aggression and offensive action.

The new Maritime Strategy emphasized offensive strikes against Soviet force and called for forward staging north of the Greenland-Iceland-Norway line. The Navy welcomed this strategy much more openly than the Carter administration’s strategy of “defensive sea control” which Secretary of the Navy John Lehman criticized as a “Maginot Line” strategy.¹¹⁵

The Army introduced an aggressive AirLand Battle Doctrine designed to defeat the Soviet Army in a large-scale conventional war. The new doctrine relied on seizing and maintaining the initiative, quick maneuver, and denying the enemy secure lines of communication. The Army also improved its limited war and counter-terrorism capacities. Light infantry divisions were capable of rapid deployments in order to handle the low intensity conflicts before they escalated to large-scale conventional wars. The Army was able to simultaneously pursue equipment modernization programs because these changes were accomplished without increasing the end-strength of the active component. Several missions of the Army were transferred to the reserve component,

which served to set the conditions for incorporating the reserve component as a partner in the national security. By 1987, reserve components provided 50 percent of the Army's Special Forces and 90 percent of its psychological operations and civil affairs unit. Terrorism activity continued to climb globally and the Reagan administration was the first to address it head-on in its policy

The Air Force's strategic attack capability was enhanced by Reagan's reinstatement of the B-1 bomber program but the Air Force did not prioritize a counter-terrorism capability.¹¹⁶ Air Force leadership maintained that Air Force systems had to be capable of flight across the full spectrum of operations and not just to support clandestine operations or insert covert missions.

The Bush Years (1989-1991)

In 1989, President Bush reduced "the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean . . . for six months annually."¹¹⁷ This strategic move in the Persian Gulf was made to enable friendly countries in the area to play more active roles in the region. Ultimately, it became one of the first moves to reduce military forces to a level more suitable to the post-Cold War threat.

The Bush administration resumed military force and budget reductions after the 1991 Gulf War (see figures 8 and 9). With the collapse of the Soviet Union the force size was scheduled for a 25 percent reduction. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended and planned for a post-Cold War Base Force capable of global power projection. Instead of sizing the force to face the Warsaw Pact in the Fulda Gap, the envisioned force would be capable of waging a major war in the Atlantic

or Pacific, fighting several smaller contingencies, and maintaining a sufficient nuclear force to deter nuclear attack.¹¹⁸

The national security strategy shifted from addressing only the geographically oriented countries of communism to engulf nations that harbored “aggressive intentions against their less powerful neighbors, oppose the spread of democracy, and are guilty of circumnavigating international norms against nuclear, biological, and chemical proliferation.”¹¹⁹

Powell identified six nations as “rogue” states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. National security required a military force capable of defeating any two of the “rogue” nations at once. This is the reference point for what was called the two Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) sized force. Key to this force size was the assumption that the United States would have to be ready to go it alone in these conflicts and could not anticipate allied assistance. General Powell felt this strategy required a military force structure about 75 percent of the size it was during the Cold War.¹²⁰

During the Bush administration, total active duty military personnel declined from 2.2 million in Fiscal Year 1989 to 1.776 million in Fiscal Year 1993. The Army lost one-quarter of its strength (770,000 to 572,000), the Air Force lost 22 percent, the Navy 14 percent, and the Marines 9.7 percent (see figures 9 and 10).¹²¹

Out of the reduced post-Cold War force structure also came a method for deploying the forces known as the Powell Doctrine. General Powell espoused three conditions under which the United States military should be committed: a) to achieve clear and measurable political objectives, b) using overwhelming force decisively and quickly to accomplish the objective, and c) have a clear exit strategy.¹²²

With the end of the Cold War and its corresponding decline in military forces in the in historical fashion, a return to domestic concerns dominated the national scene. One thing changed, however. There was an apparent shift in national strategy that included missions of humanitarian assistance on an unprecedented scale for American armed forces. The operational tempo of the Armed Forces picked up as units found themselves deployed to every part of the world as a measure of America's commitment to collective security (see figure 11).

Themes

National Defense Policy

The next portion of this chapter discusses trends and observations in the national defense policy during the Cold War years. A summary of the credibility of each administration's approach to homeland security precedes the more notable themes of national defense policy.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan provided effective economic assistance to support legitimate governments and prevented the commitment of United States Armed Forces on foreign soil. In contrast, the Kennedy administration appeared to under-appreciate the second and third order effects of foreign assistance. The unintended consequences of committing troops at the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam "...damaged homeland defense capability by eroding United States credibility as a supporter of democracy and bringing the United States to the brink of nuclear war."¹²³

The Johnson and Nixon administrations further eroded homeland defenses "...by allowing the Soviets to gain a nuclear advantage over the United States and destroyed the first efforts at United States ballistic missile defense programs."¹²⁴ Under the Ford and

Carter administrations the United States lost strategic superiority in the Middle East and Marxist governments took over countries in Africa and Latin America including countries such as Angola, South Yemen, Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.¹²⁵ The dramatic decline in American might began with the gradual escalation of troops in Vietnam and in “the 1970s ended with American defense credibility at its nadir.”¹²⁶

Homeland security was an unparalleled weakness as evidenced by the loss of the asymmetric nuclear threat over the Soviet Union, collapse of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets’ credible first strike capability. Additionally, strategic sea lines of communication for resources in both the Middle East and the Caribbean were no longer secure from Communist influence. “The situation propelled Ronald Reagan into the White House with his promise to restore America’s defense capability.”¹²⁷

Nuclear arms reduction was likely achieved under the Reagan and Bush administrations because of the military and economic strength from which the United States negotiated. By evolving to a “reduction strategy” instead of continuing the “containment strategy,” the Reagan and Bush administrations employed military and economic strength to effect diplomacy. “The Cold War era ended with United States homeland defense capability at its zenith.”¹²⁸

Three prominent themes in national defense policy during the Cold War years include credibility, economic security assistance, and collective security organizations. Credibility is the most dominant theme as evidenced in the preceding historical summary because of the need for legitimacy, clarity of purpose, and resolution to act.

Legitimacy within the United States civil-military relationship was clarified with the *National Security Act of 1947* during Truman's presidency. A clear and legal means of unified command and control was established despite the common service parochialism and bickering between military and civilian advisors. Unified planning and national policy setting were in their infancy but the conditions for success were legally set early in the Cold War years.

However, conformity to past practices despite their failure derailed America's early efforts. Communism established multiple footholds worldwide and bastions of communism grew in Korea, Vietnam, and China. Communism finally encroached upon the Western Hemisphere through Cuba and threatened the shores of America directly. The national security containment policy did not limit the spread of communism effectively from the beginning and yet subsequent presidencies continued to endorse it for over three decades. This inability to address the security shortfall continued at the cost of American credibility and legitimacy. The US was not a leader capable of promoting democracy and in turn assuring allies of their own security.

President Reagan changed the direction of national policy by abandoning the policy of containing communism and redefined success as a reduction in communist influence. He chose an aggressive offense capable of action instead of a passive, reactive homeland defense. Reagan abandoned MAD and pursued the space-based missile defense system, SDI, as a basis for strategic nuclear policy. Publishing the national security strategy with clear goals and measures of effectiveness clearly established the commander in chief's intent. Reagan's ability to identify and name areas of interest,

whether an unstable nation-state dealing with civil unrest, a communist insurgency, or a rogue state, gave much needed definition and direction for the nation.

However, the clarity evident in the Reagan administration's approach to communism was lacking in addressing terrorism. Reagan's gravest error was inconsistent execution of his counter-terrorism policy. He "did not maintain a consistent, sustained course of action using all instruments of national power to isolate and destroy both terrorist groups and their state sponsors."¹²⁹ Resolution on Reagan's part was necessary to stand clear of the no-win cycle where concessions encouraged more terrorist acts and reprisals invited more reprisals. While this minimally decreased the strength of alliances the United States held globally, it provided insight into the difficulty of combating terrorism for the future.

The second prominent theme in national defense policy during the Cold War years was a marked move from isolationism toward collective security organizations. Collective meant extending security interests beyond self-defense as the strength of homeland defense became inextricably tied to international alliances. Collective security arrangements forged iron-clad commitments to hold aggressors accountable for attacks on one as an attack on all. NATO was established and continued to serve as the linchpin of United States interests and European geographical security during the Cold War era. Forging international agreements to protect not just ones own interests but the interests of like-minded nations-states ensured access to global natural resources, open global lines of communication, and economic support for nations threatened by internal instability or neighboring aggressors or terrorists. International alliances were fostered and maintained through economic assistance and military presence throughout the Cold War years.

Economic security assistance programs, the third prominent defense policy during the Cold War years, provided the basis for strengthening the international alliances so key to global communication. The Marshall Plan and aid to Turkey and Greece proved to be successful assistance programs by strengthening the economic and political stability in regions threatened with internal instability. Security assistance in the Persian Gulf and select Middle East countries provided needed infrastructure improvements and weapons systems that aided United States and coalition forces during the Gulf War. Security assistance proved to be most beneficial to homeland security when given for a finite period of time with limited, specific goals. Without these limits and clarity, security assistance programs proved to actually be detrimental to homeland security.

Several presidencies had limited ability to predict second and third order effects of security assistance on homeland security. A lack of clearly defined, achievable objectives and a lack of pre-determined end point led to disastrous effects in Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. The unintended consequences of security assistance must be evaluated judiciously using the feasibility, acceptability, suitability test in order for the assistance to bind the ties of cooperation with other nations instead of severing them.

Civil defense programs during the Cold War years provided hope for the average citizen of surviving a nuclear strike, but in reality they were relatively useless. Fallout shelters, improved highway systems, and self-aid were good to keep people preoccupied. Kennedy even considered sending a personal letter to every American household with survival tips.¹³⁰ Civil defense could be described as an internal form of collective security for the American masses. It engaged all involved in the problem solving and load sharing

but alone, it could not ensure a free homeland. Forward presence overseas was the best form of homeland defense but defense funding was not apportioned to fully support it.

Military Posture

This final portion of the chapter describes trends and observations in the military posture during the Cold War years, including force size and defense spending. Military posture during most of the Cold War years was predominantly determined by the mentality that the United States could declare, and then prepare, for war. This was implemented as a part of national strategy by reducing the standing military force and relying on the mobilization of reserve forces. Not maintaining a ready force to prevent a war is an economically sound practice but one that inadequately evaluates risk in a constantly changing threat environment. It also does not take into account the cost of having to respond to an attack on the homeland.

The decreased military force size and reduced readiness during the Truman and Eisenhower years demonstrated an inability to respond to Korean War (see figure 4). Following the Korean War, Eisenhower focused on the nuclear force to the detriment of maintaining an effectively trained and right sized conventional force. Kennedy attempted to balance the forces by reemphasizing a balance of nuclear, conventional, and newly added special operations forces to counter the threats but then did not establish a threshold for committing military forces. The Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter years found economic and domestic programs a greater priority than defense funding and the military continued to decrease in size and funding outside of war. American nuclear superiority also caused national leadership to think only in terms of total war and it neither maintained a balanced military force nor an appropriately balanced defense

budget. Budget limits determined the size of the armed forces instead of the security threat.¹³¹ Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, under President Ford, was forced to resign because he would not condone cuts in defense spending.

The only time defense spending increased in anticipation of conflict was in 1980, President Carter's last full year in office, and through most of President Reagan's administration. This was the first time during the Cold War years that the American public was convinced to not wait for a war to come to the homeland.

Perhaps a change in America's assumed military superiority during the Carter administration facilitated the call to rearm. During the Carter administration, the Soviets overtook America in nuclear weapons offensive capability and the United States lost unchallenged control of sea lines of communications globally. The final straw may well have been America's inability to project combat power to rescue hostages in Iran.

Operation Eagle Claw may have swayed public sentiment for change but President Carter set the conditions for success strategically by establishing the Rapid Deployable Joint Task Force to address interests in the Middle East. Reagan built on Carter's stage setter; "The most dramatic alteration of command arrangements for the period 1977 through 1983 remained the establishment of USCENTCOM."¹³²

President Bush immediately reduced force size following the Gulf War despite a recognized terrorist threat. With a need for robust human intelligence requirements and international cooperation at an unprecedented level no comprehensive or sustained policy was implemented despite continued attacks on American citizens overseas. With the end of the Cold War, the advent of terrorism as the war on the horizon began a new era of "declare, then prepare."

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¹²⁴*Ibid.*, 101.

¹²⁵Lawrence E. Grinter, “Avoiding the Burden: The Carter Doctrine in Perspective,” 1-2; on-line, Internet, date, available from www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jan-feb/grinter.html

¹²⁶Jordan, M., 121.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, 121-122.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, 142.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 129.

¹³⁰John F. Kennedy, *National Security Action Memorandum No. 72* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1961).

¹³¹Office of the Chief of Military History, “Chapter 24, Peace Becomes Cold War, 1945-1950,” 538-540.

¹³²Ronald H. Cole, et al., *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Historical Office, Office of the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 85-87.

CHAPTER 3

THE INTERWAR YEARS (1991-2001)

National Defense Policy

The Bush Years (1991-1993)

Given the instability following the Cold War, the complex global security environment provided little insight for a clear path ahead to define national security. With the perceived success of America's security strategy of containment President George Bush believed "it would be reckless to dismantle our military strength and the policies that have helped make the world less dangerous."¹ He ordered a review of the national defense strategy and the counterintelligence and security countermeasures within four months of each other.² In the August 1991 National Security Strategy (NSS), Bush recognized the uncertainty in the threat environment as an internal shortfall. "We face new challenges not only to our security, but to our way of thinking about security."³ On 15 November 1991, Bush ordered "a top to bottom examination of the mission, role and priorities of the Intelligence Community" to forecast the type of political, economic, and military information needed from 1992 to 2005.⁴

As the United States transitioned from an intelligence effort focused on Soviet operational readiness to accounting for Soviet nuclear weapons, fiscal constraints made a prioritized plan of action imperative. "We must establish the proper roles, missions and priorities for U.S. intelligence . . . Otherwise, our capabilities will spread so thin to satisfy even the highest priorities."⁵ Less than six months later, the intelligence assessment was completed and Bush wrote, "I endorse the DCI's changes in the intelligence process and initiatives for improving both human intelligence collection and analysis at CIA."⁶

Actionable intelligence continued to be a proven enduring vulnerability and the Bush administration was determined to update the national security policy to prevent an attack on American interests, to have a ready capability to act, and a practiced response within the Continental United States in the event of an attack. Policy more diplomatically refers to these as deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defense.

Deterrence following the Cold War took on a new look that initially questioned whether arms control would have a place in future policy. While the Bush administration sought “fundamental alterations in Soviet military force structure, institutions, and practices,” deterrence was no longer just military might or nuclear superiority.⁷ “Arms control is not an end in itself and cannot take the place of robust military forces.”⁸ Deterrence included effective diplomatic communication aimed at addressing the cultural interests of civilizations to preemptively discover motives for conflict. “That is, deterrence is the creation of a state of mind that either discourages one thing, or encourages something else.”⁹ It quickly evolved to include a necessary use of soft and hard power to influence or coerce, respectively. Such a shift in mindset was tough for America-centric thinking to overcome with the newly won and unchallenged nuclear and military superiority.

America had to learn to deal with aggressive regimes in terms they understood but also leave room for global consensus. “Culturally effective ways and means must be found to convince these “nontraditional” domestic and foreign players that it is NOT in their interest—whatever it may be—to continue their negative behavior.”¹⁰ The greatest shortcoming of pursuing a policy of deterrence is that it is not a guarantee. It only works

as long as both parties to the dialogue says it works. Should one party discover a way to mitigate influence or actual power then deterrence becomes a facade.

The major component in America's deterrent policy was collective security. The might of the military would "strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of our allies and friends."¹¹ Bush's response to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf region echoed a concerted effort to "seek the maximum participation of its coalition partners in all aspects of operations conducted in either Kuwait or Iraq."¹²

Forward presence, another key component in deterrent policy, was positively influenced by collective and bilateral security activities in distant regions.¹³ The first two facets of the Bush NSS were interdependent and mutually supportive. Forward presence for the United States did not mean increasing troops stationed overseas to demonstrate continued engagement. Instead, it emphasized "training of its combat, engineering and logistical units for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief."¹⁴ More rotations of soldiers overseas assisted in peacekeeping and peace enforcement while simultaneously enabling the Bush administration to preemptively position forces in the most volatile regions of the world.

Some measure of continued presence in the Gulf Region was required to promote a stable and secure Gulf. "We will work with our friends to bolster their confidence and security through measures as exercises, prepositioning of heavy equipment and an enhanced naval presence."¹⁵

Concurrently, the Bush administration attempted to create the conditions "to integrate the Soviet Union into the family of nations."¹⁶ Bilaterally, the United States sought agreements emphasizing "transparency in our military relationship...including

increased contacts between the military officers” of both countries with the intent to “promote Western values and ideas...to lay a firm foundation for a cooperative relationship.”¹⁷

With the hope for more stable and secure Soviet and Gulf Regions, the United States sought to “balance our commitments with our means and, above all, we must wisely choose now which elements of our strength will best serve our needs in the future.”¹⁸ Preparation for future contingencies lies within the scope of today’s decision-making cycle. “In the Gulf, our armed forces benefited from the legacy of investment decisions, technological innovations, and strategic planning that came in the decade before.”¹⁹

In the homeland, defense measures, the third prong of the Bush NSS, increased in scope and magnitude to bring America’s ability to react should deterrence and active forward engagement fail. The civil defense program no longer focused on foreign attack alone but recognized a need for a capability to respond to domestic instability “in order to protect the population and vital infrastructure.”²⁰ The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would provide program direction with the support of Federal Departments under the direct supervision of the National Security Council. Civil defense plans included advanced warning systems, coordinated information and public education efforts, and restoration of life support capabilities.

The Clinton Years (1993-2001)

The Clinton administration issued a NSS Report every year from 1995 to 2000 that described deterrence with economic, nuclear, intelligence, and space applications.

Forward presence was personified in peace operations worldwide and homeland defenses were managed systemically but constrained economically.

President Bill Clinton believed the line between United States domestic and foreign policies was thinning and the key to global prosperity was economics. The 1995 NSS focused on enlarging democratic influence worldwide by opening foreign markets and spurring economic growth.²¹ The NSS in 1997 changed mostly in name as it addressed the approach of a new century. Security continued to depend on a ready military force, economic wealth, and democratic enlargement abroad. In 2000, the Clinton administration published the longest NSS to date at 84 pages. It also changed the title to usher in the Global Age but repeated the emphasis on prosperity and security around the world through a democratically driven market economy.

Clinton's 1994 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR) elaborated the policy for "nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation objectives."²² The START II treaty was the base document for nuclear force structure and the NPR reflected a reduced role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy. NPR established a national policy of "lead and hedge" which meant "the US will lead strategic arms control efforts toward START II or smaller force levels, but retain the ability to hedge by returning to START I levels."²³ Ultimately, the need for ICBMs and SLBMs was revalidated with the NPR.

Also in 1994, Clinton called for a review of security processes to "adapt our security policies, practices, and procedures as the economic, political and military challenges to our national interests continue to evolve."²⁴ He desired flexibility to adapt to the ever-changing threat environment but constrained the initiative fiscally when he

stipulated the security processes “must provide the security we need at a price we can afford.”²⁵

The Clinton administration later defined intelligence requirements from tier 0 to tier 4 as part of the national defense policy on nonproliferation. Tier 0 is the highest priority and is reserved for warning and crisis management. Support to Military Operations are Tier 0 requirements as are international terrorism, crime and drugs. *PDD-35* “increased the priority assigned by the intelligence collection and analysis capabilities to the proliferation threat.”²⁶ Later in *PDD-39*, Clinton stated there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction “or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.”²⁷

National security policy also included outer space. The national space policy rejected any claims of sovereignty in space by other nations but stipulated that space systems and data collected from space are sovereign rights. “Access to and use of space is central for preserving peace and protecting U.S. national security strategy as well as civil and commercial interests.”²⁸

The Clinton administration widened the role America’s military could play in peace keeping operations in 1993 and increased the Armed Forces forward presence overseas exponentially. “U.S. forces could help plan, train and participate in U.N. peace-keeping activities when justified by general U.S. interests, not just when the United States could make a unique military contribution.”²⁹ Four years later Clinton issued *Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, in hopes of coordinating military and civil support for peace operations to act proactively and avoid “massive human suffering.”³⁰ This directive mandated a political-military

implementation plan for each complex contingency operation, which was loosely defined as a peace operation. The real purpose for this plan was for civilian leadership to have control of peace operations “to centralize planning and decentralize execution during the operation.”³¹ Two years later, little had been done and the military continued to shoulder the increased burden for diplomatic as well as military duties in peace operations.³²

Despite the Clinton administration’s core concepts of democracy and market economics being “more broadly accepted around the world than ever before,” Clinton took steps to improve counterintelligence effectiveness to protect the homeland.³³ His fervor for restructuring focused on interagency coordination after CIA Agent Aldrich Ames espionage investigation began.

Homeland defenses included a policy on countering terrorism as Clinton pledged to “apply all appropriate means to combat it.”³⁴ It was clear that the Clinton administration thought it important to reduce vulnerability to terrorism but it was unclear what the appropriate means were to combat it. “Agencies directed to participate in the resolution of terrorism incidents or conduct of counterterrorist operations shall bear the costs of their participation.”³⁵

In 1998, protection of critical infrastructure in the homeland was addressed in detail in *PDD-63*. “Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government.”³⁶ Specific tasks and guidelines were assigned to organizations such as the Departments of Justice, Transportation, and Commerce as well as FEMA, the CIA and FBI. Clinton’s intent was to “assure the continuity and viability of critical infrastructures,” across the Federal Government, state and local governments, and the private sector by protecting their

ability to provide essential services including public health and safety, telecommunications, energy, financing, and transportation.³⁷

Military Posture

The Bush Years (1991-1993)

Despite the end of the Cole War the national strategy continued to call for military power to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) while providing a credible presence overseas.³⁸ The 1992 *National Military Strategy* listed four requirements to support national security; strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and force reconstitution. With the Bush administration's assessment of the threat environment and the mission set listed above, military strength was cut nearly 12 percent in two years continuing to meet the promises and commitments prior to the Gulf War (see figure 10). The strength was cut to meet the two MRC threat, a short list of rogue states, and several small-scale contingencies. Defense spending also dropped to its lowest percentage of the Federal Budget since prior to World War II (see figure 8).

The Clinton Years (1993-2001)

President Clinton continued the Bush administration defense spending cuts and broke below the 20 percent mark as part of the national budget (see figure 8). He also decreased defense spending to less than 5 percent of the GDP before closing out his presidency at a contemporary historical low of less than 4 percent of the GDP.

“Since the Army budget was insufficient for all of its requirements—contingency deployments, procurement of needed systems, modernization of old systems, necessary training, and restructuring—quality of life for soldiers and families suffered.”³⁹ Housing

for Army families dated 28 years of age for single soldiers, 63 years of age for family housing stateside, and 130 years old for overseas housing.⁴⁰

Quality of life not only suffered but military service members were increasingly targeted by terrorists throughout Fiscal Year 1996. Nineteen airmen were killed in Saudi Arabia, five Americans killed and 54 wounded on an Army installation in Saudi Arabia, and 400 U.S. citizens had to be evacuated by military forces from Liberia.⁴¹

“In the transformation from a forward-deployed, threat-based force to a capabilities force, operating largely from the continental United States, the Army’s revised modernization concepts no longer focused on systems but on capabilities.”⁴² “The transition from a forward-deployed Army to a power-projection force neared completion as hundreds of installations were closed overseas.”⁴³ Base realignment and closures saw the 1996 fiscal year end with 97 percent of European closures complete, 86 percent of Korean, and 30 percent in Panama with the 1999 withdrawal only three years away.⁴⁴

Active Army strength dropped 6.1 percent from 575,000 in FY 93 to 540,000 in FY 94.⁴⁵ “In addition, the U.S. Army had dropped from being the fourth largest active-duty army in the world in FY 89 to the seventh largest in FY 96, behind China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Turkey.”⁴⁶

Despite the draw down, military forces were used across the spectrum of operations. “The Army witnessed a 300 percent increase in operational deployments after the end of the Cold War, with soldiers and Department of the Army civilians deploying to more than seventy countries in 1994.”⁴⁷ In 1996 alone, Special Operations Forces soldiers participated in 850 missions in over 101 countries. Operation Joint Endeavor involved over 139 Army Reserve units and National Guard units from twenty-two states. Forward

stationed soldiers in Europe deployed to Bosnia, Croatia, and Hungary. Soldiers performed security assistance in Haiti, Peru, Ecuador, Iraq, and the Sinai as well as humanitarian assistance in Haiti and Cuba. Domestic assistance included floodwaters, hurricanes, wildfires, and blizzards. The Army also supported the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta and aircraft and victim recovery in the TWA Flight 800 crash.⁴⁸

Themes

National Defense Policy

“The end of the Cold War meant shrinking budgets and switching from a global to a regionally based strategy, a smaller conventional capability, and a rationalization of strategic nuclear forces.”⁴⁹ With the Cold War confusion and uncertainty of the future there was comfort in staying busy. “The general result in the United States has been the ad hoc and piece-meal crisis management of security affairs.”⁵⁰

The true danger America faced in the global pause following the Soviet collapse was focus on a clear purpose – a direction. Instead of fixing the national eye on the horizon for the oncoming threat, Americans returned to the domestic agenda and individual prosperity. Turning inward and narrowing the security focus on a regional basis hinted at a return to isolationism.

“Perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. national security is the danger that we Americans do not easily change our thinking to coincide with the changes in the world around us.”⁵¹ Defense was focused throughout most of the Cold War on a low-probability, high-intensity nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Reality was that nearly all conflicts were low-intensity and in Third World countries. Now, with a proliferation of instability marked by weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, a

paradigm shift in strategic thinking must “involve the development of a theory of deterrence to replace the theory of containment.”⁵² Uncertainty and ambiguity are the norm for contemporary conflicts in the near future. The center of gravity may no longer be a nation-state or its military forces but a regime of sorts without overt state-backed funding. As such, the center of activity for leveraging power rests with balancing public opinion. Political leadership needed domestic public opinion and the ability to dissuade the public from joining the antagonistic regime in the warring country.

One example of how political leadership must influence public opinion is the matter of casualties. Aided by President Bush’s and General Colin Powell’s rhetoric during the Gulf War, America casualty aversion was heightened. The Clinton administration accepted the myth that America is “casualty averse.” The loss of eighteen United States Army Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993 and the requirement to fly at 15,000 feet during the Kosovo air campaign in 1999 represent presidential leadership that sheepishly succumbed to this myth. The political leadership had the ability and responsibility to shape the public response as part of the basic fieldcraft of all statesmen. Sometimes public representatives must divorce desires of their constituents from the needs of the country. Ultimately, each elected representative of the United States, whether it is a Senator or the President, serve the country as a whole, foremost, and the constituents of their state, action committees, and parties second.

With the onset of peace operations on such a grand scale, “conflict has become multi-organizational, multi-lateral, and multi-dimensional.”⁵³ Factions waged war instead of national military armies and battle space included urban areas more often than not. As such, civilian populations cluttered the battlefield. Government and non-government

organizations, international and private voluntary organizations also crowd the battlefield with right-minded intent and become competitors with military forces in the battlespace.

When it came to forward presence the challenge for policymakers was to gain “multilateral actions that directly enhance the security interests of the United States and are perceived by others as legitimately contributing to a stable and just international order.”⁵⁴ Peace operations, with a preference for peacekeeping over peace enforcement, since all parties desire the settlement in peacekeeping, became the avenue by which military forces patrolled foreign lands.

“Two unresolved contradictions have contributed in very significant ways to the Army’s inability thus far to deal effectively with vexing issues such as domestic defense at home and force protection abroad.”⁵⁵ The two unresolved contradictions are the struggle to define the Army’s role and the degree of self-sacrifice contemporary soldiers exhibit. The concern for definition was founded on conflicting political guidance. The Army was still required to successfully wage two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts after the Cold War ended, a fact supported by the lack of change in the Army’s Cold War infrastructure. “In stark contrast, the Clinton administration has since 1993 repeatedly received the approval of the American people for the conduct of military operations other than war (MOOTW).”⁵⁶ Coupled with this contradiction is the questioning of individual soldier sacrifice as “soldiers are deployed an average of over 140 days per year away from families and home post; the average is well over 200 days per year for those soldiers and families assigned within Europe.”⁵⁷

Homeland defenses took on a role much like the military by assuming nationwide networks to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes as well as foreign attacks.

Military Posture

Clearly, the Bush administration foresaw the importance of human intelligence capability to support the national objectives of deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses. As it assessed the new threat environment it continued its pre-Gulf War manning cuts resulting in a 12 percent decrease in two years. The Clinton administration cut manning 19 percent, with the bulk of cuts in the first term in office (see figure 10). This amounted to thirteen straight years of decline in the military strength with each service cut over 35 percent, with the exception of the USMC that experienced only a 12 percent decline.

Defense spending as a percentage of the Federal Budget in 1991 was the lowest since before World War II before finally dropping below the 20 percent mark in 1994 under the Clinton administration (see figure 8). Defense spending as a percentage of GDP stayed below 4 percent for most of the 1990's (see figure 8).

In contrast, space had security-related applications for the military but it was clearly stated in the National Space Policy that the Clinton administration aspired to the civil and commercial applications it offered economically.

The Interwar Years evidenced increased terrorist targeting of United States civilians and military members, domestically and abroad. Arguably, the increased deployments and OPTEMPO created greater opportunity for terrorist activity to reach

American shores. “Army activities during FY 96 demonstrated clearly that the new world order would require military vigilance and U.S. military participation.”⁵⁸

The military continued to increase its domestic assistance for national crises of aid and support. At the same time, the military strength drew down and non-war-like activities increased. During the Interwar Years, “the bottom line is that the Army is torn between “fighting the big wars” and preparing for and executing “operations other than war.”⁵⁹

¹George H. W. Bush, *National Security Review 12* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1989), 1.

²George H. W. Bush, *National Security Review 18* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1989), 1.

³George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991), 1.

⁴George H. W. Bush, *National Security Review 29* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991), 2.

⁵*Ibid.*, 3.

⁶George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 67* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1992), 1.

⁷George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 23* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1989), 2.

⁸*Ibid.*, 4.

⁹Edwin G. Corr and Max G. Manwaring, “Toward A National Security Policy And Strategy For Now And the 21st Century” in . . . *to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence* . . . (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000), 267.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 268.

¹¹George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 23* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1989), 3.

¹²George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 54* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991), 3.

¹³George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991).

¹⁴George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 74* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1992), 2.

¹⁵George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991).

¹⁶George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 23* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1989), 7.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 4-6.

¹⁸George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991).

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰George H. W. Bush, *National Security Directive 66* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1992), 1.

²¹Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 7-8; on-line, Internet, accessed December 21, 2003, available from <http://www.army.mil/cmhp/DAHSUM/1996/ch01.htm>.

²²William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 30* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 1.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 29* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 2.

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 35* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1995), 1.

²⁷William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 39* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1995), 9.

²⁸National Science and Technology Council, *National Space Policy Fact Sheet* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1996), 2.

²⁹R. Jeffrey Smith and Julia Preston, "United States Plans Wider Role in U.N. Peace Keeping" in *Washington Post*, June 18, 1993.

³⁰William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 56 - White Paper* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1997), 2.

³¹*Ibid.*, 6.

³²Rowan Scarborough, "Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions" in *The Washington Times*, December 6, 1999, on-line, Internet, accessed March 21, 2004, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>.

³³William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 24* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), 1.

³⁴William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 39* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1995), 1.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 9.

³⁶William J. Clinton, *Presidential Decision Directive 63* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), 1.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 2.

³⁸Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 8.

³⁹Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 148.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 147.

⁴²Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1994*, 143; on-line, Internet, accessed December 21, 2003, available from <http://www.army.mil/cmhp-g/books/DAHSUM/1994/ch09.htm>.

⁴³Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 3.

⁴⁴Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 149.

⁴⁵Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1994*, 141

⁴⁶Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 4.

⁴⁷Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1994*, 3.

⁴⁸Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 147-148.

⁴⁹Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, and Willard J. Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993* (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995), 108.

⁵⁰Corr and Manwaring, 261.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 262.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 261.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 265.

⁵⁴Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, *American National Security: Policy and Process*, 4th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 493.

⁵⁵Don M. Snider, John A. Nagl, and Tony Plaff, “A Strategic View Of Where The Army Is: Homeland Defense And Issues of Civil-Military Relations” in . . . *to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence* . . . (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2000), 230.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 232.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 234.

⁵⁸Department of the Army, *Army Historical Summary: FY 1996*, 150.

⁵⁹Snider, Nagl, and Plaff, 229.

CHAPTER 4

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (2001-)

National Defense Policy

The Bush Years (2001-2003)

In early May 2001, President George W. Bush called for a comprehensive review of intelligence processes. The review had a “broad mandate to challenge the status quo and explore new and innovative techniques, systems, practices and processes” for intelligence collection.¹

Nuclear posture was also revised with the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. United States Strategic Command was combined with United States Space Command uniting global responsibility for America’s nuclear arsenal. Additionally, “the old triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles has given way to a triad of strategic offensive capabilities, strategic defenses, and the infrastructure and research and development.”²

The Bush administration ushered in a series of firsts for homeland defense. A national strategy for homeland security was published to address the specific ends, means, and ways of domestic defense. After the horrors of the 9/11 attacks, the Department of Homeland Security was established to centralize the security effort at a national level. United States Northern Command, a regional combatant command, was also established with primary responsibility for the area of operations including the United States, Canada, and Mexico. These firsts in national policy strengthened the core need to focus on a credible homeland defense.

The 2002 NSS relied “on force to support international standards, rather than international standards to contain hostile force. It is a strategy for American leadership by action, rather than leadership through cooperation.”³ This NSS had a different context than those of the previous ten years; it was written while at war. Where the contemporary interwar years could only speculate on potential threats, the new Bush administration had a dangerously proven threat that was still alive. The threat in the 1990’s was to American values whereas the threat to America in the twenty-first century began with a question of survival. In the 1990’s involvement in peace and humanitarian assistance operations extended the values of what America aspired to become worldwide. In 2001, a shift in world affairs threatened not just the United States but also the friends and allies dependent on the United States.

The Global War On Terror (GWOT) is the first contemporary war, one directly targeting the survival of United States. As a result of America’s global influence, this threat was a global concern and arguably “a threat that cannot be deterred.”⁴ Deterrence is based on several premises including (1) inability to destroy the enemy in a single blow, (2) mutual ability to identify both parties, and (3) a persuasive and costly counter-response by the targeted party. In all three cases terrorism defies deterrence as an effective strategic instrument of power. Cyber tactics and proliferation of WMD empower nations, regimes, and aggressive activists to destroy the infrastructure of the United States in a single coordinated attack. Regimes with limited, if any, overt ties to nation-states are the shadowy delivery boys of terrorism whose identity is often only confirmed following an attack. And finally, fanatical militarism based on supposed

missions from the Almighty Creator cannot be intimidated or negotiated even if the attacker could be identified.

Results-based action and preemption replaced deterrence in its traditional definition in the 2002 NSS because terrorist attackers could not be persuaded the cost of attack was too great. The potential magnitude of future terrorist attacks was unprecedented and the immediacy with which an attack could be executed was at the speed of electrons. The change in security policy was born out of necessity of a nation at war with real hate, real destruction, and a desire to not restrain the United States from unilateral action. Keep in mind that because the nation was at war this NSS was specific to the time it was written. It addressed the war it was engaged in and barely mentioned non-war related or terrorist related matters of national security.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) supplemented the 2002 NSS to provide a short-term plan and set the conditions for long-term effective homeland defenses. The strategic objectives, the ends of the NSHS, were to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, to reduce vulnerability, and to minimize the damage of attacks that did occur. The strategic concepts, the ways of the NSHS, included six critical missions: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency response. The resources, or means of the NSHS, included the assets of federal and local agencies, information sharing systems, and limited military commitments. All three parts of the strategy, the ends, ways, and means addressed the threat domestically, internal to the continent and its surrounding water and air space.

In contrast, the forward presence of troops sought to strike terrorist activity before it reached the homeland. Forward presence as a component of national security strategy was almost doubled as the number of active duty armed forces overseas increased from 21 percent to 39 percent, including Operation Iraqi Freedom, in 2003 (see figure 12). Not since the Gulf War more than ten years earlier had American forces been forward deployed in such mass.

In the view of the administration, the cost of combating terrorism abroad and at home was bearable when compared to the cost following a catastrophic attack. Bush discounted the financial cost of a war with Iraq by stating, “The price of doing nothing exceeds the price of taking action . . . The price of the attacks on America . . . on September 11th [was] enormous . . . And I’m not willing to take that chance again.”⁵

Military Posture

The Bush Years (2001-2003)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers noted the military has shifted from a regional to a global view. “In the past . . . uniformed leaders in Washington maintained the global vision, while the majority of U.S. military organizations maintained a regional or functional focus.”⁶ Evidence of this was readily apparent with complete global coverage under the 2002 Unified Command Plan by five regional combatant commands. Russia, the Caspian Sea, Antarctica, and the countries of North America were finally placed within a combatant commander’s areas of responsibility.

Military strength increased 2 percent from 2001 to 2002 bringing the standing active duty force to over 1.41 million (see figure 10). Defense spending increased one

percent of the national budget and one-half a percent of GDP from 2001 to 2003 (see figure 8).

Themes

National Defense Policy

Deterrence is not an effective way of countering terrorism for the three reasons cited above. But the efforts taken by the United States to prevent continued terrorism did dampen the most immediate threats to American survival. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the continued battles in both locations bought America time to develop its security institutions at home. Survival of the United States was the basic national security goal and although there was no guarantee against terrorism the threat was reduced.

The GWOT is more appropriately a war waged than a war capable of being won. A few assumptions were proven to be facts over the course of time to support the enduring nature of terrorism. One realistic assumption was the terrorist's will to fight and his ability to attack can only be reduced, not eliminated. This assumption has been proven true daily but remains an assumption to discount any measures of effectiveness that permit a claim of victory and consequently deny a threat still existed. This assumption remains an assumption in hopes of not under-estimating the enemy and instilling a false belief that winning a series of battles wins the war on terrorism.

Another assumption is that attackers would use any means available across the full spectrum of operations to target American influence abroad and at home.⁷ Al Qaeda proved that they were adept at thinking and acting "outside the box." And a third assumption proven factual is that combating terrorism cannot be done alone; multilateral cooperation is required. It was discovered that some countries had a sphere of influence

that equated to a form of deterrence. Saudi Arabia appeared to have an expectation of safety from Al Qaeda. Perhaps it was a reluctance to kill other Arabs, an unwillingness to offend the Arab community and bring the full brunt of the Arab religious allies, or simple inconsistency “with its vision of focusing its violence on the United States.”⁸ Regardless, the United States looked to its allies and friends for signs of support to combat terrorism globally.

One emerging theme is that assumptions about terrorism were wrong and terrorist targeting had changed and certain tendencies were prevalent. “Commercial aviation, diplomatic facilities, and American (or allied) servicemen recur as targets. Naval vessels in port (or in narrow straits), government buildings, monuments, and symbolic landmarks also figure prominently.”⁹ This diversity of targets supports the belief that the aim of extreme violence extended beyond a military engagement to every facet of life. Those targets are also centers of gravity to a lesser degree; to the degree that those targets will not destroy the American influence in conventional terms but degrade and embarrass the American way of life. Terrorists use hard power to actually brutalize or kill supporters of American influence but targets on the mass scale are a soft power attempt to win recruits for their regime.

In terms of forward presence, the United States accepts a large burden by attempting to deny Al Qaeda activity. A terrorist attack has to be successful only once. To attempt to measure success in combating terrorism by the number of attacks prevented or number of terrorist cells broken up is misleading. Terrorism always places the target in a defensive role. The defender has to be successful each and every time at every location a terrorist strikes. It is impossible to defend the homeland in any such manner where

threat mitigation and consequence management are the best-case scenarios. The answer is to meet international terrorism at the source of the problem--overseas.

A theme in homeland defense is consolidation of responsibilities in homeland security to establish not just a method of prioritizing efforts, but also a way to fiscal responsibility and national accountability. The infant institutions of homeland security and the new coordination channels will require time to mature. Taking the fight to terrorist regimes in other countries buys the United States that time. While the cost is in American lives in foreign countries, the sacrifices of the military are for the security and survival of the country. Some degree of terrorist threat is always expected to exist and will become a permanent part of American lives as it is for the United Kingdom and Ireland. Terrorism will not be allowed to hinder leading productive and satisfying lives but become a matter of life much like crime, cancer, and traffic accidents.

Another emerging theme is the use of media to maintain public consensus and persuade the international community. Media embeds with combat units not only enhance public opinion stateside but also work to keep the troops informed and attempted to compete for Al Qaeda's large reservoir of recruits. Retired Army General George Joulwan applauded V Corps Commander Lt. Gen. William Wallace's statement to the media during the Iraq war that the military prepared for an adversary different from what they found. "It is important for political and military leaders to say that our initial assumptions were wrong."¹⁰ Full disclosure by military officials, within the scope of operational security, presents insight for the public in order for them to make informed decisions versus speculating on what is not said.

A major shortfall of the NSHS is its failure “to take into account the effects of globalization in planning for the nation’s security.”¹¹ There is little evidence of global appreciation for combating terrorism in the ends, way, or means as listed in the NSHS. One recommendation to instill a global mindset for homeland security is to acknowledge that all regional combatant commanders have geographic responsibilities under homeland security. As such, “...their TCPs should be integrated into the NSHS.”¹² Theater Cooperation Programs (TCP) are clear regional plans that provide United States support to allies and they could take a step further to exchange relevant intelligence and yield cooperative efforts against terrorism. The homeland includes air, sea, land, and space out 500 miles yet the threat to the homeland extends globally. Without a concerted effort to tie all US assets into a seamless continuum homeland defenses remain constrained to reacting to an attack.

Security is costly and its economic burden may be the second or third order effect Al Qaeda is attempting to elicit. America’s vulnerability may be the manner in which it economically responds to sustained terrorism. As such there must be a balance of power that reinforces America’s mission is not retribution for September 11 attacks. “It is the destruction of a terrorist enterprise that threatens American security.”¹³

While the NSHS lacks a global view, the 2002 NSS emphasizes assurance of friends and allies and depends on multilateral security. As the President’s policy reemphasizes a global perspective, the military has an obligation to change to meet the commander’s intent. “Transformation is at the heart of the new strategy.”¹⁴

Military Posture

Slight increases in defense manning and spending correlates to the military's continued commitment to transformation. The "bigger is better" mentality is replaced by a network-centric organization that depends on technology and seeks to streamline processes, deploy faster and further, and communicate instantaneously. "We must think and act in a world that changes too rapidly for the archaic budgeting, acquisition, personnel, and management systems in place today."¹⁵ The military forfeits windows of opportunity for gaining and maintaining asymmetric dominance by abiding to historical practices that amount to transformational and ultimately operational constraints.

The Army is undergoing extensive transformation initiatives with increased emphasis on being a part of the Joint Force. Interoperability among the sister services is not fully integrated yet the Armed Forces seeks coordination and multitasking to the point of interdependence.

The three aspects of force redesign, reinvestment and rebalancing, "taken in the aggregate, enable the Army to dynamically recast its forces to meet the needs of the NSS, Combatant Commanders, and Army commanders in an austere fiscal environment with acceptable risk."¹⁶ Redesign consists of revising the Army's business rules to achieve efficiencies in communications systems and strategic lift requirements. In turn, the gained efficiencies in personnel and logistics systems are reinvested to reinforce critical capabilities of Combatant Commanders. Rebalancing the Active Component/Reserve Component mix not only addresses the near term rotational demands of sustained combat operations but also places the requisite soldiers with the knowledge, skills, and abilities where the Army needed them most; in the proper proportion.

A slight increase in active duty military manning during the Bush administration ends a thirteen-year decline. Each year of the Bush administration effectively increased the same numbers in strength that the Clinton administration decreased the two years previously. Thus the 2002 active duty military strength nearly matched the 1998 manning.

Military spending also increased slightly by the close of FY 2003 at 17.8 percent and 3.5 percent of the national budget and GDP, respectively. The upward trend in percentage of GDP by the Bush administration already exceeds Clinton's second term average percentage of 3.15. Anticipated increases in FY 2004 would easily exceed the 3.56 percent of GDP the Clinton administration averaged over its eight-year presidency.

Risk management is an emerging theme as one of the new strategic tenets listed in Rumsfeld's 2002 Annual Defense Review. Four categories of risk are described for which effective management balances the available resources "against the needs of maintaining a capable and ready force, the requirements of near-term operations and contingencies, the demands of transforming . . . and the imperatives to streamline and modernize internal processes in the Department."¹⁷ "The global war on terrorism as presently defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate U.S. military and other resources in an endless and hopeless search for absolute security."¹⁸

Risk in the 2002 NSS under the 1-4-2-1 force structure is assessed as moderate risk; the acceptable target level. The force structure is apportioned to defend the homeland, deter aggression in four critical regions, fight in two major theater wars simultaneously, and decisively defeat one of them at the president's discretion. There

remains one quantifiable element that increases the risk assessment to a high level of risk against this force structure; small-scale contingencies (SSC). The NSS does not set a threshold for the number of SSCs that will raise risk and no triggers are mentioned but the number of SSC's continues to increase as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, and Cuba continue with no withdrawal date in sight. "The challenge for our armed forces today is to balance these regional responsibilities with the need to address missions that are global in nature."¹⁹

¹George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive 5* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2001), 1.

²Richard B. Myers, "Shift To A Global Perspective" in *Naval War College Review* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, Autumn 2002), 13.

³David McIntyre, "Understanding the New National Security Strategy of the United States," ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, Institute Analysis 009, September 2002.

⁴David McIntyre, "What We Are About: The War for Homeland Security" ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, Institute Commentary 017, March 2003.

⁵George W. Bush, "'We're Calling for a Vote' at the U.N.," *Washington Post*, 7 March 2003.

⁶Myers, 9.

⁷Brian M. Jenkins, *Countering Al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 15.

⁸*Ibid.*, 25.

⁹*Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰Elaine M. Grossman, "General, Journalist Square Off Over Using Media For 'Deception,'" *Inside The Pentagon*, 20 November 2003, 1.

¹¹Antulio J. Echevarria II and Bert B. Tussing, *From "Defending Forward" To A "Global Defense-in-Depth": Globalization and Homeland Security* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), vi.

¹²Ibid., 14.

¹³Jenkins, 30.

¹⁴Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2002*, Chapter 2, 5 [report on-line], Internet, 31 October 2003, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/html_files/chap2.htm.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Annex B: Force Structure (Organizations) in Army Modernization Plan 2003.

¹⁷Rumsfeld.

¹⁸Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 46.

¹⁹Myers, 14.

CHAPTER 5

THEMES AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

To say that democracy has been awakened by the events of the last few weeks is not enough. Any person will awaken when the house is burning down. What we need is an armed guard that will wake up when the first starts or, better yet, one that will not permit a fire to start at all.¹

John F. Kennedy

Themes

This study evaluated three strategic tenets of homeland security; deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses, across presidential administrations from 1945 through 2003. Deterrence, defined in this study as passive prevention, moved from an attempt to contain the spread of communism worldwide, through a decade of unclear threats, and came up short early in the twenty-first century by failing to address terrorism. Forward presence, typically measured in Armed Forces commitment, an active form of prevention and also a response to failed deterrence, naturally increased with the onset of war against terrorism. But forward presence also changed in nature during the Interwar Years as the threshold for troop commitment lowered to accommodate MOOTW and SSCs. Homeland defenses, primarily reactive in nature to an attack, progressed sequentially from an era of civil defense measures aimed at individual survival of a nuclear attack to dependence on the local, state, and national governments for a false sense of security.

Several trends are not new or emerging but timeless. Those are the most enduring vulnerabilities of homeland security while the emerging themes are milestones to fully appreciating the national security threats looming on the horizon (see table 2).

Table 2. Implications of Homeland Security Strategy

Strategy	Themes	Implications
Deterrence	Uncertainty	Democracy forces the U.S. to be slow and reactive in nature
	False reliance on deterrence	
	Narrow strategic focus	Must prepare for the next threat now
	Balance of power emphasized unilateral action over collective security	Imbalance increases instability and forces others to use unconventional warfare
Forward Presence	Deployed to shape the environment in U.S. model	Tendency to assure and restore stability via democracy when stability, not democracy, is the first concern
	Increased commitment of troops	Establish a threshold to balance deployments for war, OOTW, and SSCs
Homeland Defenses	False sense of security	Citizenship and leadership must accept/normalize terrorism
Military Posture	Decrease in manning	Doing more with less forces the military into a reactive posture
	Decrease in funding	
	Increase in OPTEMPO	

National Defense Policy

Themes in deterrence, forward presence, and homeland defenses as they related to national defense policy follow. Two prominent themes in deterrence included uncertainty and balance of power.

Uncertainty of threats, both the nature and quantity, remained the foremost constant in national strategy. National policy attempted to address uncertainty at the strategic level by focusing regionally during the Cold War on areas most susceptible to the influence of communism. During the Interwar Years national policy emphasized democratic enlargement via economic prosperity for the entire world. With the terrorist attack and emergence of the GWOT, national policy returned to a regional perspective focused on threat capabilities.

This narrowness of thinking appeared to be a weak pattern and cause for concern. The 2002 NSS focused on terrorism to the point of failing to identify any non-terrorist related security threats. Admittedly, this NSS was written in a time of war but its narrow scope omitted non-military threats such as, “external domination of a country’s economy by citizens from another state or foreign corporations, total dependence on another country for scientific research and technological developments, unrestricted movement of ideas resulting sometimes in the erosion and eventual loss of national identity, and pollution of the seas and atmosphere leading to the upset of the globe’s ecological balance.”²

Additionally, defining national security remained a philosophical debate amidst the chaos of politics. National security specifically identified the nation as the basic unit of concern. Any security matter must put the needs of the nation above those of individual segments of the population. “Thus, for example, any policy that serves to maintain a ruling elite in power or to favour a particular section of the population at the expense of the nation as a whole cannot be termed a policy of national security.”³ The political question was a combination of Clausewitz’s maxim for beginning with a clear endstate for war and a balance of personal integrity and acting in the best interests of the country despite what the country thinks. *Profiles of Courage*, by John F. Kennedy, was written to remind the United States of the importance of moral courage in the political arena for the sake of the government and ultimately the people. Strategic planners and policy makers must remain vigilant in the face of jumping on the terrorism bandwagon and following the status quo. The danger for homeland security lies in an over-reliance

on one specific threat, terrorism, at the detriment of identifying the security threat on the horizon.

A second theme of uncertainty was America's national policy-makers willingness to falsely rely on deterrence as a means of counter-terrorism for over 40 years. As a result, the GWOT proved to be another example of America's tendency to "declare, then prepare" for a war. The nature of the combat in Iraq continued to prevent America from finishing decisively and appeared to have no quantifiable measure of effectiveness for achieving success. Prussian philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, believed the statesman and the commander must first "establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its true nature."⁴

Identifying the character of war is the first and most encompassing strategic question for clarification. The very nature of terrorism suggested strategic thinking had not adequately addressed the distinction between waging war on terrorism and combating terrorism.

Waging war implied leading to a decisive conclusion yet terrorism could only be combated in the hope of reducing the likelihood of catastrophic acts.

America perpetuated an unwritten policy of "declare, then prepare" for war because of several basic tenants of American government. Surprisingly, obtaining consensus from the legislative and executive branches is not the weakest link in the chain. Gaining domestic public consensus does however make the United States slow to act. President Franklin Roosevelt anticipated American involvement at the outset of World War Two, but public opinion forced him to declare the United States a neutral party until the homeland was directly and militarily attacked. The GWOT demonstrated the same looming reality on the horizon following the Cold War. Three presidencies

knew there was an increasing threat and the country continued to struggle in hindsight with trying to quantify actionable intelligence. But the country, the general public and many elected representatives, enjoyed the contemporary interwar years as a time to reduce defense spending and focus on the domestic agenda. America's inability to anticipate attacks on the homeland were a product of their uncertainty evidenced by a slowness to act, a narrow strategic focus, and a false reliance on deterrence.

One other theme was discerned as it related to deterrence; balance of power. The Cold War policy of collective security agreements with international allies and friends acted as a deterrent to protect the homeland. Subsequently, America has always sought willing coalitions to protect its national interests. Kenneth Waltz, noted "interdependence promotes stability and decreases the use of military force as the economic and political interests of nations come closer together."⁵ Regional and global stability were sought collectively with nation-states as the primary actors. Waltz defined the 21st Century as the century of the nation-state and others have cited that the 21st Century is the American Century.⁶ Many years must pass before either of these predictions is historically validated especially amidst the changes in America's national security strategy in 2002.

The NSS portrayed diametrically opposed objectives in deterring nuclear and conventional military parity while claiming unilateral preemptive military action. Instead of assuring allies and dissuading adversaries, the policy actually induced instability by distancing the United States as a long global leader with the intent to keep it that way. The United States has forced the rest of the world to perceive a balance of power in which someone must win or lose power with limited opportunity for a win-win scenario. Samuel P. Huntington warns that "clashes of civilization are the greatest threat to world

peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.”⁷ Whether the future holds conflict based on nation-states, regimes, clashes between or within cultures a balance of power based on collective security agreements, diplomatic authority, and economic influence remain vital to global security and ultimately, American national security.

Forward presence, the second part of national defense policy, has two dominant themes; (1) it is an extension of deterrence to confront any threat before it reaches the homeland and (2) it promotes stability, although not always democracy.

Forward presence is an extension of deterrence as well as military doctrine to pursue resolution through an offensive rather than a defensive posture. The commitment of military forces is a measure of America’s resolve. *Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, lists the Army’s first mission essential task as shaping the security environment. Shaping is defined very specifically as “boots on the ground.” With the intent of stopping any attack before it reaches the homeland, a forward presence was America’s way of pursuing a good defense with a strong offense.

Numerically, America forward positioned from one-fifth to one-third of active duty forces overseas and endorsed the notion that the military only “plays away games.” Following World War II, American forces established overseas installations and maintained a steady state of 34 percent of Active Duty Army forces during the Cold War and 21 percent during the interwar years and the GWOT (see figure 12). Overseas percentages understandably spiked during the deployments for the Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003. However, mere presence only began to set the conditions for increasing regional stability.

The main focus of national security supported by forward engagement was to preserve stability. An emerging contemporary trend has been the desire to spread American democracy around the world. From the days of President Wilson, the goal has always been to influence other nation-states to pursue democracy and through it prosperity. But democracy is not synonymous with stability in all regions of the world. Ultimately, national security is measured against the number and type of threats that contribute to instability. To impose democracy on an unwilling culture or government actually increases instability. The danger of forward presence is not just the size of footprint of forces but the actions those forces are directed to support in order to increase stability.

Homeland defense, the third part of national defense policy, has a dominant theme that emphasizes a growing divide between military and civilian populations. The United States desires all the benefits of an open society where “borders no longer have the significance they held in past centuries, particularly for a country that serves as the linchpin of the global economy.”⁸ Unfortunately, globalization brings inherent risk to the homeland for every individual regardless of whether or not he/she is a member of the Armed Forces or a non-combatant.

Expressed another way, the emerging trend in America is its unwillingness to participate at an individual level. Read the following statement by John F. Kennedy about the United Kingdom in preparation for World War I and imagine the indifference or indignation Americans would display if asked to forego any of their wealth building or daily consumption requirements today.

England was now awake; it had taken a great shock to bring home a realization of the enormity of the task it was facing. All the latent energy stored up in England during the last seven years is being expended in a vigorous drive for victory. Industry and labor, the rich and the poor, are contributing to England's fight for survival, with the knowledge that this is a supreme test of democracy's ability to survive in this changing world.⁹

The task of the GWOT sounded all encompassing; after all, it was a global war. It was clear in the months following cessation of hostilities in Iraq in 2003 that the battles and wars of the last two decades had little to no impact on daily lives for the majority of Americans.

Disparity in numerical representation added to the growing divide between the civilian and military cultures. As the United States total population continued to grow at a rate of one percent or better yearly, the active duty military as a percentage of the United States populations dropped with each consecutive war (see figure 13). The last time the military accounted for one percent of the total population was 1976. Since 1996, the military has only equaled one-half of one percent. Americans reclined their consciences, passed the ownership and responsibility of statesmen to the military, and relied on a military forward presence. This divide between civilian and military cultures misrepresented the increased scope of military operations.

Just as misleading were the civil defense measures taken by presidential administrations in the name of homeland defense; the third part of the national defense policy. From the days of public fallout shelters, coastal defenses, evacuation routes on superhighways, and family affordable underground bunkers during the Cold War to the paper task forces during the Interwar Years, the focus was on putting the public fears at ease by providing a semblance of hope. What developed was a "dumbed-down" citizenship with a growing propensity to demand government protection. Americans no

longer knew how to react to an attack as they did in the 1950s and 1960s. They no longer recognized an individual responsibility for survival but assumed there was a government entitlement. They focused on their own objectives of prosperity through consumption. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security reinforced this notion that the government was looking out for its citizens. Americans have grown accustomed to the false sense of security perpetuated by informational and economic measures.

Military Posture

Themes for military posture included a propensity by Americans, evidenced by the votes and actions of their representative leadership, to maintain a relatively small military force and to fund it according to the demonstrated needs of the security environment. Demonstrated need of the security environment refers to the willingness of Americans to support a strong military numerically and fiscally in times of grave danger to the homeland. Additionally, within the last two decades, Americans have endorsed sponsoring military involvement in regions of the world when the homeland is not in a direct threat. Humanitarian assistance and peace operations are the mainstays of MOOTW that have broadened the scope of military commitments.

The other prominent theme extends back to the days of America's infancy when the founding fathers introduced a constitutional mandate for a standing military force, primarily in the Navy, but maintained a healthy skepticism for it, thereby limiting its size. The United States has always relied on mobilization of reserve or militia forces in lieu of maintaining a costly, large force. As such, the posture of the military is constrained economically and numerically. Accordingly, the military assumed a degree of risk by taking a defensive posture and relying on time to mobilize its forces and national assets.

A resulting doctrine of “declare, then prepare” and a slowness to act perpetuated into the 21st Century are enduring vulnerabilities.

The Armed Forces were sized in consideration of conventional, unconventional, and nuclear capabilities. Each presidency arrayed these capabilities in a manner to address security threats. In the Cold War, containment eventually gave way to reduction under Reagan until the collapse of Communist Russia. International terrorism had struck America as early as the 1960s and the interwar years presidencies struggled with countering the uncertainty of terrorism and multi-polar threat it with a capabilities-based approach. In the GWOT years the Bush administration emphasized transformation necessary to address the increasingly militant and fanatical reality of international terrorism. But the emerging trend in military posture remained a marked decrease in military strength and military defense funding but an expectation for unparalleled deployments and operational tempo.

Future Implications

National Defense Policy

Implications of deterrent themes center on uncertainty, narrowness of strategic focus, and over-reliance on deterrence. The elder George Bush warned in 1991 of the sense of urgency with which a credible defense must be reconstituted. A stronger defense had to be emplaced faster than any potential opponent could generate an overwhelming offense. “The standard by which we should measure our efforts is the response time that our warning processes would provide us of a return to previous levels of confrontation in Europe or in the world at large.”¹⁰ Uncertainty in the threat environment, equivalent to the “fog of war,” will remain the foremost enduring vulnerability of homeland security

strategy. The inability to pinpoint threats and discern actionable intelligence has increased exponentially in the Information Age. While there are absolute gains in fidelity of specific datum, the sheer volume hinders strategic focus. The attacks of 11 September confirm America's tendency to "wait-out" the next threat and then respond to it. Despite the impetus for transformation during the GWOT, nearly every effort to change is focused on terrorism versus the fight looming on the political horizon.

America perpetuates uncertainty because it is a democratic society and as such is designed to act slowly. Democracies are essentially peace-loving and as such are at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to waging war that "they cannot look ahead to the day when they will find occasion to fight."¹¹ Government planning and budgeting cycles are also too slow to respond to the ever-changing security threat.

Future implications for deterrence revolve around gauging uncertainty in the security environment and balancing America's military, economic, and political power in the eyes of the international community. "This difficult task will require us to invest in hedging options whose future dividends may not always be measurable now."¹²

The implication of the 2002 NSS created or recognized an already existing imbalance of global power. Instead of shepherding the long-held political and military collective security agreements from the Cold War and interwar years into the 21st Century, the United States set itself alone; atop the world stage. In 1999, then-Texas Governor George W. Bush may have foreshadowed his preemptive policy and the tangible reality of an American empire. "In the dark days of 1941--the low point of our modern epic--there were about a dozen democracies left on the planet. Entering a new century, there are nearly 120."¹³ With a ten-fold increase in democracies worldwide,

perhaps the United States could lead the world to prosperity and stability as a benevolent hegemon. The danger in going it alone lies in the self-perceived infallibility of United States judgment in determining the common good of humanity.

Additionally, the strength of the United States has two obstacles to sustaining preeminence. The first obstacle is sheer size; the United States has only 4.6 percent of the world population and it cannot indefinitely respond to global burdens. Secondly, the unipolar nature of international policy is not sustainable since friends and foes will work to right the balance of real or perceived dominance.

The implication of re-setting the world balance of power below the United States instead of around the United States creates future obligations that increase instability in the international community and ultimately threatens homeland security. Multipolar international policy is the basis for collective security agreements and economic assistance programs. Changing to a unipolar structure increases uncertainty and reinforces the danger in falsely maintaining deterrence as a form of national policy.

Implications for forward presence are America's aim to preserve or restore stability abroad and establishing a threshold for troop commitment. The aim to preserve or restore stability has implications in the future because American's and like-minded countries have a tendency to encourage or persuade other countries to adopt democratic-like practices. Unfortunately, stability does not necessarily mean democracy. John F. Kennedy wrote of England's dominance in the early 1900s by saying, "For the long run, then, democracy is superior. But for the short run, democracy has great weaknesses."¹⁴ The speed with which America responds is described previously in this study as a

weakness of American democracy. Yet, it is that same hesitancy to elicit a knee-jerk reaction that stabilizes the country.

The other implication for increased forward presence, evidenced by OPTEMPO, is the need to establish a threshold for troop commitment. Forward presence is an extension of offensive doctrine. The danger for future commanders is to blindly emulate the “can do” attitude at undue risk to their soldiers and ultimately the stability of the United States military. Willingness to accept sacrifice by Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines is not a measure of effective presence.

Use of forward presence as a flexible deterrent option must be spelled out to prevent an unintentional gradual escalation of troop strength. Any attempt by the United States to bluff an adversary would be useless since he will “know exactly how much the democracy is bluffing, because of the free press, radio, and so forth, and so can plan his moves accordingly.”¹⁵

Troop commitment already exceeds the 1-4-2-1 force structure model in the 2002 NSS. America has exceeded the moderate risk level stipulated for this model and continues to look at technology as the solution. The danger with network-centric and technological distancing on the battlefield is that minimal bloodshed of virtual war “could render unnecessary the presidential leadership, military statesmanship, and popular commitment to the fight that was seemingly in such short supply.”¹⁶ The gravest implication for forward presence as a part of national defense policy is addressing a human problem with a technological answer.

The implication for homeland defense is relying on a false sense of security imposed by all the changes seen under the Department of Homeland Security and the

dependence on government. America must understand and accept terrorism as a fact of life and that it will not end on some date in the near or distant future.

It means that in preparing for war today . . . a democracy may be struck such a knockout blow . . . that she will not be able to bring in the latent advantages that she possesses. It is only in the long war that the advantages of a greater spirit and determination among the people will be effective.¹⁷

The GWOT will not have a definitive completion date like World War I and II, the Cold War, or the 100-hour Gulf War. “Rather, it will be more like the wars on crime or drugs or poverty. Because the problem can never be entirely eliminated, victory becomes defined in terms of managing the level of risk down to acceptable levels.”¹⁸ Up until 11 September, the terrorist attacks of the preceding forty years had never exceeded an “acceptable level of violence.” The implication of combating terrorism is that there will be a steady-state of sorts that America will normalize terrorism as it does cancer and crime. Transitioning to this mindset is critical to long-term stabilization of America as a democracy.

Military Posture

Implications for military posture extend beyond decreased manning and decreased funding to balancing the increased deployment of forces through transformation. Of gravest concern is transforming to a force that is outdated by a continuously changing threat environment. “Experience indicates that organizations that have successfully transformed have usually had a few senior leaders . . . serve for double or triple the length of tour of typical general officers.”¹⁹ The military does not have the luxury of time to retain leaders to effect change even if its adversaries agreed to pause and let American intelligence agencies catch up.

Transformation of the mindset in leadership is critical for the military just as it is for Americans to adjust to the reality of terrorism as a part of daily life. The Objective Force calls for the capability to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. “But human intelligence is not a U.S. strength.”²⁰ With a “just-in-time” mentality of rapidly deployable units of action, the enemy forces and locals have the better capability to see, understand, and act first as inhabitants of the environment. American forces arrive late in the game and struggle to catch up thus forcing themselves into a reactive and more costly posture.

The implication for future force posture is that the military must remain vigilant, adaptable, and reactive; just like national defense policy. Current and past experiences may have little relevance to the next conflict. “The essential demands on our military forces to deter conflict whenever possible but to prevail in those that do arise—are certain to endure.”²¹

¹John F. Kennedy, *Why England Slept* (New York: Wilfred Funk, Inc., 1940), 230-231.

²Robert D. Matthews, “National Security: Propaganda or Legitimate Concern?” in *Problems of Contemporary Militarism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 145.

³*Ibid.*, 143.

⁴Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and tran. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88.

⁵Kenneth N. Waltz, “Globalization and Governance” in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 32, no. 4 (December, 1999): 694.

⁶*Ibid.*, 696.

⁷Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 321.

⁸Randall Larsen, “The Greatest Threat: Now What You Might Think,” (ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, March 2003), [article online], Internet, 14 September 2003, available from http://www.homelandsecurity.org/HLSCCommentary/greatest_threat.htm.

⁹Kennedy, 211.

¹⁰George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991).

¹¹Kennedy, 223.

¹²Bush.

¹³George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism,” (remarks at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999).

¹⁴Kennedy, 224.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 227-228.

¹⁶Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.) *The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300-2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5.

¹⁷Kennedy, 226.

¹⁸Michele A. Flournoy, “Strengthening Homeland Security” in *Transforming America’s Military* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), 280.

¹⁹Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions,” in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 2002): 81.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 80.

²¹George H. W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991), 1.

FIGURES




Figure 2. Military Posture--President Truman Years (1945-1952)

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 3. Defense Spending Percentages (1945-1960)

Source: United States Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 1967* (88th edition) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), 252; and United States Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 2000* (120th edition) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), 339.




Figure 4. Military Posture--President Eisenhower Years (1953-1960)

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 5. Military Posture--1960s

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 6. Defense Spending Percentages (1961-1973)

Source: United States Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 2000* (120th edition) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), 339.




Figure 7. Military Posture--1970s

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 8. Defense Spending Percentages (1974-2003)

Source: United States Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States: 2000* (120th edition) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), 339.




Figure 9. Military Posture--1980s

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 10. Military Posture--Post-Cold War Years

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 11. Increased Operational Tempo (1950-2002)

Source: Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 2003), Figure 1-4.




Figure 12. Forward Stationed Active Duty Army Comparison (1978-2003)

Source: Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports “DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Strength Levels Fiscal Years 1950-2002” [On-line]; Internet, 10 January 2004, available from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms9.pdf>.




Figure 13. US Civilian to Military Population Comparison

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003, Mini-Historical Statistics, No. HS-1. Population: 1900-2002* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003).

GLOSSARY

Homeland. (NORTHCOM): The homeland includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The defense of Hawaii and the territories and possessions in the Pacific remain the responsibility of U.S. Pacific Command. Northern Command is responsible for security cooperation and coordinated with Canada and Mexico.

Homeland. (NSHS): The United States shares a 5,525 mile border with Canada and a 1,989 mile border with Mexico. The maritime border included 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable waterways as well as 3.4 million square mile exclusive economic zone.

Homeland Defense. (DPG): The protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression.

Homeland Security. (NSHS): Concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

National Security. (DoD): A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b) a favorable foreign relations position; or c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.

Security. (DoD): a) Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. b) A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.

Security. (NATO): a) The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. b) The measures necessary to achieve protection against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure.

Weapons of Mass Destruction. (DoD): Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.

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